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Although firm financial policies were affected by a credit contraction during the recent financial crisis,
the impact of increased uncertainty and decreased growth opportunities was stronger than that of the
credit contraction per se. From the start of the financial crisis (third quarter of 2007) to its peak (first
quarter of 2009), both large and investment-grade non-financial firms show no evidence of suffering
from an exceptional systemic credit contraction. Instead of decreasing their cash holdings as would
be expected with a temporarily impaired credit supply, these firms increase their cash holdings sharply
(by 17.8% in the case of investment-grade firms) after the fall of Lehman. Though small and unrated
firms have exceptionally low net debt issuance at the peak of the crisis, their net debt issuance in the
first year of the crisis is no different from the last year of the credit boom. In contrast, however, the
net equity issuance of small and unrated firms is low throughout 2008, whereas an impaired credit
supply by itself would have encouraged firms to increase their equity issuance. On average, the cumulative
financing impact of the decrease in net equity issuance from the start to the peak of the crisis is approximately
twice the cumulative impact of the decrease in net debt issuance. The decrease in net equity issuance
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After the crash of the dot.coms, the U.S. went through a striking credit boom that was followed by a 
dramatic financial crisis.
1 The crisis, which is generally considered to have started in August 2007, was 
unexpected.  It became the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression after the surprising events of 
September 2008, which include the bankruptcy of Lehman and the rescue of AIG, when panic reigned in 
the markets and there were concerns about whether the financial system would keep functioning.
2 In this 
paper, we investigate firm-level financial policies during the crisis, taking advantage of the fact that its 
abrupt start and its unforeseen virulence following Lehman’s bankruptcy make it a natural experiment to 
study the impact of an unexpected systemic crisis.   
The conventional view of the crisis is that bank losses from toxic assets led to an abrupt contraction 
of credit (see Brunnermeier (2009)). These toxic assets were mostly securities backed by subprime and 
related mortgages, so their loss of value had little to do with the performance of industrial firms, making 
the credit contraction an exogenous event for these firms. Research in finance, including research on the 
recent financial crisis, argues that exogenous credit contractions have real effects on firms, in that firms 
cannot obtain financing as planned and therefore reduce investment.
3 An important issue with this 
research is that it is difficult to assess whether investment falls because of the credit contraction directly 
or because firms have fewer attractive investments and thus borrow less. In this paper, we take one step 
back from directly studying the impact of credit contractions on investment and instead investigate how 
the financial policies of firms differ during the financial crisis compared to normal times and what those 
differences tell us about the extent to which industrial firms suffered from an impaired credit supply.  
                                                            
1 There is a vast literature on financial crises. Schularick and Taylor (2009) state that “In line with the previous 
studies we define financial crises as events during which a country’s banking sector experiences bank runs, sharp 
increases in default rates accompanied by large losses of capital that result in public intervention, bankruptcy, or 
forced merger of financial institutions.”   
2 In this paper, we use the bankruptcy of Lehman as a short-hand for the events that took place in the second half of 
September 2008 and beginning of October 2008 that led to sharp decreases in stock prices and dramatic increases in 
credit spreads and LIBOR. Among others, these events include the collapse of Washington Mutual, the run on 
money market funds, the rescue of AIG, and the merger of Merrill Lynch. We are not taking a position in this paper 
on the issue debated in the literature of whether the changes in credit spreads and LIBOR were caused by the 
bankruptcy of Lehman or by subsequent events (see Taylor (2009)). 
3 References to this large literature include work focused on the impact of monetary policy (e.g., Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994)), Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), and Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994)) as well as more 
recent work focused on specific events associated with changes in the supply of credit (e.g., Sufi (2007), Leary 
(2009), and Lemmon and Roberts (2010)). Papers on the financial crisis are discussed later in this introduction. 2 
 
There is much evidence that financial policies depend on both financial market conditions and 
macroeconomic conditions (see references, for instance, in Baker (2009), Erel, Julio, Kim and Weisbach 
(2010), and Korajczyk and Levi (2003)). Based on this evidence, we would expect to find that firms 
exploit advantageous conditions in credit markets and that their leverage increases when such conditions 
obtain. As the availability of credit becomes restricted, we would expect firms to borrow less. With 
suddenly less welcoming credit markets, firms should use their cash holdings to finance investment since 
precautionary holdings of cash, whose importance has been emphasized in the recent literature (see, for 
instance, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)), exist precisely to mitigate the impact of 
adverse shocks. Finally, to the extent that a credit contraction is of an unprecedented scale, we would 
expect the decrease in net debt issuance to also be of an unprecedented scale. 
As credit becomes harder to obtain, we would also expect firms to reduce their dividend payouts, to 
repurchase less stock, and to issue more equity (see Leary (2009) for evidence of the latter). However, at 
least since Miller (1963), we also know that equity issues are particularly sensitive to the business cycle; 
equity issues fall during downturns, a phenomenon which is consistent with the view expressed in the 
literature that information asymmetries become more important as corporate net worth falls (e.g., 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989)), as growth opportunities disappear (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 
(2009)), and as the cost of equity capital increases as investors become more risk-averse. The overall 
impact of these combined forces on equity issues is ambiguous. If firms issue equity to offset the effects 
of the credit contraction, we expect equity issuance to increase. Alternatively, if the business cycle effects 
dominate, we expect equity issuance to fall with the economic downturn. It follows that if the dominant 
factor in financial policies during the crisis is the exogenous curtailment of credit to industrial firms, 
additional equity issuance should offset some of the shortfall in firm debt financing. However, if the 
dominant effects are increased information asymmetries, a disappearance of growth opportunities, and an 
increase in risk premia, equity issuance should fall.  
We investigate firm financial policies using quarterly data, which is the highest frequency corporate 
data available. Consequently, we must define quarters that correspond to the financial crisis. Early August 3 
 
seems to be the consensus starting point of the crisis (e.g., Paulson (2010)). In our analysis, we are 
interested in the financial phase of the crisis, which we define as the period from the start of the third 
quarter of 2007 through the end of the first quarter of 2009. Though the crisis continues after the first 
quarter of 2009, financial markets start to stabilize such that at the end of the second quarter of 2009, both 
the stock market and credit spreads reflect better economic conditions than at the end of the first quarter 
of 2009. Specifically, the spread of the high yield Merrill Lynch index over intermediate term treasuries 
reaches its low point for 1983-2009 in the second quarter of 2007, increases to unprecedented levels after 
the Lehman bankruptcy, and falls back to pre-Lehman bankruptcy levels in the second quarter of 2009. 
The S&P 500 index reaches its lowest value in March 2009, but it rebounds sharply during the second 
quarter, so that the end of the first quarter of 2009 is the index’s lowest end-of-quarter value during the 
crisis. For comparison, we consider the credit boom phase to extend from the beginning of 2005 through 
the second quarter of 2007.      
We also investigate firm financial policies using both asset-weighted and equal-weighted results.  
Firms in the U.S. differ dramatically in size, with a small number of large firms co-existing with a large 
number of small firms. It is well-known from prior research (e.g., Bernanke (2007)) that the impact of a 
credit contraction should differ across firms of different sizes, since large firms are more likely to have 
access to public debt markets, while small firms rely more on bank financing. Equally-weighted averages 
of financial ratios reflect the characteristics of small firms. Asset-weighted averages of financial ratios 
represent the ratios for the industrial sector as a whole, or the aggregate of U.S. industrial firms.  
When examining the aggregate of U.S. industrial firms, we show that the credit boom is associated 
with a decrease in cash holdings, a less than one percent change in leverage, an increase in the rate of 
stock repurchases, and a small increase in dividends to assets. The evidence on stock repurchases is 
consistent with the aggregate evidence from 1984 to 2009 of Jermann and Quadrini (2009), who find that 
aggregate payouts to equity are pro-cyclical. Except for the increase in dividends and repurchases, these 
trends persist after the start of the financial crisis in the third quarter of 2007. To measure the extent of 
borrowing, we focus on net debt issuance from the cash flow statement. The advantage of this measure is 4 
 
that there are many different ways for firms to borrow and this measure includes all of them. 
Consequently, if one type of borrowing is especially restricted – say bank borrowing – it allows for the 
fact that firms have substitute forms of borrowing – for instance loans from institutional investors. 
Strikingly, aggregate net debt issuance (obtained from the cash flow statement of firms) in the first twelve 
months of the crisis is actually higher than during the last twelve months of the credit boom, and net 
equity issuance (from the same source) is about the same. This evidence is consistent with Chari, 
Christiano, and Kehoe (2008), who find that aggregate bank credit to firms does not fall in the first year 
of the crisis. As noted by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b), such evidence does not distinguish whether 
firms are receiving new credits or simply drawing down existing credit lines. However, in either case, 
firms’ net debt financing is not lower. Confirming the low initial impact of the credit contraction on 
aggregate data, we find that capital expenditures to total assets are virtually the same in the last twelve 
months of the boom and the first twelve months of the crisis for our sample of public firms. 
Slightly more than one year after the beginning of the crisis, markets were further disrupted by the 
events of September 2008.  In the following, when we discuss financial policies after the bankruptcy of 
Lehman, we consider financial policies for the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.
4 After the 
bankruptcy of Lehman, aggregate net debt issues fall, but not to levels that are extreme outliers in the 
sample – strikingly, neither of the first two quarters after Lehman has aggregate net debt issuance at or 
below the fifth percentile of the distribution of quarterly aggregate net debt issuance in our sample. In the 
aggregate, the drop in net debt issuance is more than offset by a reduction in equity repurchases. 
However, aggregate cash as a percent of assets (the cash ratio) increases by 1.30 percentage points in the 
two quarters following the bankruptcy of Lehman, a two-quarter increase unmatched since the start of our 
sample. The fact that in the aggregate firms do not use cash to offset a curtailment in credit availability 
suggests that concerns about the future brought about by the crisis, which increase the precautionary 
demand for cash, are more important than the direct impact of the decrease in credit availability.   
                                                            
4 One could argue, however, that the financial data for the end of the third quarter of 2008 already partly reflects the 
impact of the collapse of Lehman. By considering only the two quarters we do, our analysis is conservative and may 
ignore some of the impact of the collapse of Lehman. 5 
 
Though it is hard to find traces of an exceptional crisis before the events of September 2008 when 
investigating aggregate data, the impact of the crisis shows considerable heterogeneity across different 
firm types when examining equally-weighted data. Yet, net debt issuance in the first twelve months of the 
crisis is similar to the last twelve months of the boom for all firm types. However, after Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, the extent to which net debt issuance falls is inversely related to firm size. Net debt issuance 
in the first quarter of 2009 is the worst since the start of our sample in 1983 for unrated and small firms, 
but not for large and investment-grade firms. All types of firms increase their cash holdings after 
Lehman’s bankruptcy, but before then all but large and investment-grade firms decrease their ratio of cash 
to assets. The percentage increase in cash holdings after Lehman’s bankruptcy is largest for investment-
rated firms, for which it is 17.8% on average. We would expect the least debt-dependent firms to be firms 
with no debt. Strikingly, these firms experience a substantial increase in their cash ratio after Lehman, so 
the increase in cash holdings cannot be attributed simply to firms drawing down credit lines or to firms 
concerned about their ability to roll over existing debt.     
No type of firm uses increased equity issuance to reduce the impact of a possible curtailment in credit 
availability. To the contrary, small and unrated firms experience a reduction in their net equity issuance 
before they experience a reduction in their net debt issuance. Further, from the start to the peak of the 
crisis, the average cumulative cash flow shortfall from the reduction in net equity issuance is roughly 
twice the magnitude of the average cumulative cash flow shortfall from the reduction in net debt issuance. 
In contrast, net equity issuance for large firms is not different during the first twelve months of the crisis 
compared to the last twelve months of the boom. For these firms, the decrease in net debt issuance 
between the top of the boom and the peak of the crisis is less than the decrease in net repurchases, so that, 
on average, the decrease in repurchases makes up for the lost cash from reduced net debt issuance.  
After documenting the changes in financial policies during the credit boom and the financial crisis, 
we use models of cash, net debt issuance, and net equity issuance from the literature before the financial 
crisis to investigate whether these changes in financial policies remain after controlling for changes in 
firm fundamentals. Starting with cash, we find that abnormal cash (defined as the actual cash ratio minus 6 
 
the cash ratio predicted by the regression model) of small firms falls from the end of the credit boom to 
the quarter before Lehman and then increases again; however, the abnormal cash for these firms at the 
peak of the crisis is not significantly different from the abnormal cash at the top of the boom. For firms in 
the top three size quintiles, abnormal cash at the peak of the crisis is sharply higher than at the top of the 
boom. For instance, abnormal cash increases by 2.83 percentage points during the financial crisis for the 
largest firms. Similarly, investment-grade firms increase abnormal cash over the crisis in a way that is not 
explained by fundamentals. In contrast, abnormal cash does not change significantly for speculative grade 
and unrated firms.  
We next turn to net debt issuance. We find that firms have significantly negative net debt issuance in 
each quarter after Lehman, but not before. When we turn to debt rating subsamples, we show that 
investment grade firms do not exhibit abnormally low net debt issuance in the quarter after Lehman, 
while the other rating subsamples do. Further, the largest firms do not experience abnormally low net debt 
issuance in the quarter after Lehman either, while smaller firms do. All subsamples experience abnormal 
net debt issuance in the first quarter of 2009.  We estimate similar equations for net equity issuance. 
Unrated firms and the smallest firms have significantly negative abnormal net equity issuance throughout 
2008.   
Our evidence adds to an increasing literature on the implications of the financial crisis for industrial 
firms. This literature generally finds that the supply shock to credit associated with the financial crisis has 
an economically significant impact for some subsets of firms. In particular, using survey data, Campello, 
Graham, and Harvey (2010) show that firms that were credit constrained in 2008 reduce their spending 
plans, bypass attractive investment opportunities, and burn more cash. Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and 
Weisbenner (2009) show that firms which had a substantial proportion of their long-term debt maturing 
immediately after the third quarter of 2007 reduce investment substantially in comparison to other firms. 
Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2009) show that credit constrained firms draw down credit 
lines during the crisis, but also face difficulties in renewing credit lines. They further provide evidence 
that the terms of credit lines become progressively tighter during the crisis. The importance of credit lines 7 
 
is also emphasized by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010a, 2010b), who demonstrate that in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, new loans to large borrowers fall by 47% from the previous quarter. They provide 
evidence that firms draw down their credit lines after the Lehman bankruptcy. Strikingly, they show that 
the drop in lending by banks is highly dependent on the financial conditions of banks in that banks that 
rely more on deposit financing reduce lending less. Further, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010b) shows that 
firms with credit lines hoard the funds drawn in cash. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) find that firms 
with greater excess cash holdings at the beginning of the crisis reduce investment less early in the crisis 
but not later. They interpret their evidence as consistent with the existence of a supply shock to credit that 
is less costly for firms with excess cash. Iyer, Lopes, Peydró and Schoar (2010) find no credit supply 
reduction for large firms in Portugal, but find that younger firms with weak bank relationships are 
affected. Our investigation complements these papers in that we focus on the financial policies of 
industrial firms, on how they differ from normal times, and on what these differences tell us about the 
impact of the financial crisis on industrial firms. Our work also contributes to the large literature on 
financial policies and we note some of the contributions to that literature later.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we introduce the dataset we use. In Section 2, we show 
how cash holdings, debt and equity issuance evolve during the credit boom and the financial crisis. In 
Section 3, we contrast the evolution of financial policies across different types of firms. In Section 4, we 
use pre-crisis models of cash holdings, debt issues and equity issues to separate expected and unexpected 
changes in financial policies and to assess further how financial policies differ during the crisis. We 
discuss the interpretation of our results and conclude in Section 5.    
     
Section 1. The sample 
Most empirical work in corporate finance uses annual data. For our purpose, such data is unsuitable 
since it would force us to ignore how corporate financial policies differ after Lehman’s failure from 
before; it would make it impossible for us to examine the financial crisis from the top of the credit boom 
to the peak of the financial crisis which, as already discussed, we define as the first quarter of 2009. We 8 
 
therefore use quarterly data collected from the CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) Fundamentals Quarterly 
database for 1983-2009. 
There are distinct problems with the use of quarterly data. First, many of the Compustat data items are 
only provided annually, so less data is available on a quarterly basis than on a yearly basis. Second, many 
industries have seasonal factors. There is little we can do to deal with the lack of data availability, but we 
can address the seasonality issue. The first approach we use to address the seasonality issue is that we 
often compare quarters to identical quarters in other years. The second approach is that we estimate 
models that specifically allow for seasonality.  
In our investigation, we use issuance data from the cash flow statement. This is not the data typically 
used in the literature that focuses on security issuance to better understand firms’ capital structure 
decisions. That literature typically considers changes in debt or equity above a threshold (see, for 
instance, Leary and Roberts (2005)) or considers only public issues (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 
(2010)). In this paper, we are focused on the funding obtained by corporations from all sources, not just 
banks or public markets, since substitution across funding sources could help firms offset the impact of a 
bank credit contraction, for instance (for evidence of such substitution see, for instance, Iyer, Lopes, 
Peydró and Schoar (2010)). We are also focused on understanding whether financing flows are unusual, 
so that a net debt issuance close to zero for a class of firms is of interest to us since it could be abnormally 
low.  
The quarterly issuance data we need in our investigation is only available beginning in the third 
quarter of 1983. Consequently, our sample effectively starts from that quarter and ends with the first 
quarter of 2009. We delete observations with negative total assets (atq), negative sales (saleq), negative 
cash and marketable securities (cheq), cash and marketable securities greater than total assets, and firms 
not incorporated in the U.S. If a firm changes its fiscal-year end, and thus a given data quarter is reported 
twice in Compustat (for both the old fiscal quarter and the new fiscal quarter) we retain the observation 
for the new fiscal quarter only. Finally, we eliminate all financial firms, which we define as firms with 9 
 
SIC codes between 6000 and 6999; we also eliminate utilities, which we define as firms with SIC codes 
between 4900 and 4949.  
 
Section 2. The aggregate evidence 
At the start of the crisis, our sample includes 3,198 firms. When we divide firms listed on the NYSE 
into quintiles based on total assets and assign non-NYSE firms to these quintiles, we find that 2,021 of the 
3,198 firms are smaller than the largest firm in the bottom quintile of NYSE firms. Consequently, at the 
beginning of the crisis, two-thirds of our firms are small firms with assets less than $715.7 million. The 
average and median assets for these firms are $196.6 million and $127.6 million, respectively. In contrast, 
the mean and median of assets are $31.9 billion and $16.1 billion, respectively, for the firms in the top 
quintile. We therefore examine the financial policies of firms in two different ways. First, we weight each 
firm by its assets. Second, we weight each firm equally. As we will see, results using the asset-weighted 
approach are strikingly different from the equally-weighted approach. Such differences occur when the 
experience of large firms differs from the experience of small firms, as equally-weighted results are 
dominated by small firms while asset-weighted results are dominated by large firms. At the end of the 
section, we examine the role of credit lines for a random sample.   
 
Section 2.1. Asset-weighted results 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the asset-weighted results. We start with the asset-weighted ratio of cash to 
assets, where cash is cash and marketable securities (cheq). We show the values of this ratio from the first 
quarter of 2005 to the first quarter of 2009. The cash ratio shows a u-shape during this period. It starts in 
2005 with a value of 10.42%, falls to 9.49% at the top of the credit boom, and ends the period at 10.18%. 
Consequently, at the peak of the financial crisis, firms hold more of their assets in the form of cash than at 
the start of the crisis. After the top of the credit boom, the ratio keeps falling and reaches its lowest point 
(8.89%) at the end of the third quarter of 2008. In the last two quarters alone, the cash ratio increases by 
1.30 percentage points, representing an increase in cash holdings of 9.5%. There is no other two-quarter 10 
 
period in our sample where the cash ratio increases by more.
5 We assess the significance of these changes 
using two different approaches. The first approach (seasonality-adjusted p-values) is extremely 
conservative in that we compare the change of interest to changes over identical quarterly calendar 
periods to account for seasonality. For example, to investigate the statistical significance of the increase in 
cash holdings of 1.30 percentage points after Lehman, we use the distribution of two-quarter turn-of-the-
year changes in cash holdings. This approach has low power since it uses only 26 two-quarter changes, 
but it fully adjusts for seasonality. The second approach (Newey-West p-values) uses all two-quarter 
changes but relies on Newey-West t-statistics to account for overlap. The 1.30 percentage point change 
over the last two quarters is significant irrespective of the approach we use. In contrast, the increase in 
cash holdings from the top of the boom to the peak of the crisis is only significant with the Newey-West 
t-statistic.   
In the first year of the crisis, the cash ratio falls by 0.58 percentage points. One is tempted to conclude 
that firms react to the crisis by consuming cash and that this is evidence of a supply shock to credit. 
However, such a conclusion does not withstand more careful study. To see why, note that from the fourth 
quarter of 2005 to the fourth quarter of 2006, a period of abundant credit, the cash ratio falls by much 
more, namely by 0.90 percentage points. A falling cash ratio is therefore not necessarily indicative of a 
recession or of a credit contraction. As discussed in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), we understand only 
partly why the cash holdings of industrial firms more than doubled since the early 1980s. That trend stops 
during the credit boom and cash holdings fall, but not drastically. The aggregate cash ratio peaks at 
10.77% at the end of 2004; it then falls to 9.49% at the start of the crisis and bottoms out at 8.89% in the 
third quarter of 2008.     
The next two columns examine net debt issuance. We use two measures to examine net debt issuance.  
For either measure, there is no difference between net debt issuance in the last twelve months of the credit 
                                                            
5 The next highest increase is 1.22 percentage points from Q3 1999 to Q1 2000. There was much concern about 
potential software problems at the turn of the century and this concern most likely explains this hoarding. Because 
cash holdings were lower at that time, the percentage change in cash is higher at the turn of the century (18.8%) than 
from 2008Q3 to 2009Q1 (14.6%).   11 
 
boom and the first twelve months of the crisis. The first measure is obtained from the statement of cash 
flows and is calculated as long-term debt issuance (dltisy) minus long-term debt retirement (dltry) divided 
by lagged assets.
6 Strikingly, the highest net long-term debt issue ratio does not occur during the credit 
boom period, but in the last quarter of 2007. Though this ratio dips in the quarter after Lehman, it is 
always positive. In contrast, it has a negative value in the second quarter of 2005 – as well as in twelve 
other quarters before 2005. The second (and broader) measure of debt issuance, which we refer to as net 
total debt issuance and which includes short-term debt, is examined next. This measure is calculated from 
the balance sheet data and includes changes in both long-term debt (dlttq) and debt in current liabilities 
(dlcq) during the quarter. With this measure, we again see that the highest ratio is in the last quarter of 
2007. The ratio falls steadily after the last quarter of 2007 and turns negative in the first quarter of 2009. 
Strikingly, however, there are six quarters since 1983 where this ratio has a lower value than in the first 
quarter of 2009. Consequently, when looking at the asset-weighted data, none of the quarters from the 
start of the crisis to its peak show evidence of this crisis leading to debt issuance ratios that are the lowest 
in our sample period, or even in the bottom 5% of the distribution.  
We turn next to the aggregate ratio of net equity issuance to lagged assets, where aggregate net equity 
issuance is defined as aggregate equity issuance (sstky) minus aggregate equity repurchase (prstkcy). 
Equity issuance falls during the crisis. However, more strikingly, equity repurchases (not reported in 
table) decrease sharply. Because of these offsetting effects, net equity issuance is similar in the last twelve 
months of the boom and the first twelve months of the crisis. Equity repurchases reach a peak of 1.51% of 
assets in the third quarter of 2007 and fall to 0.31% of assets in the first quarter of 2009. The repurchase 
peak and trough coincide with the highs and lows of the stock market. The decrease in repurchases more 
than finances the increase in cash holdings – or the decrease in net debt issuance using the net total debt 
issuance measure. Though we do not show dividends in the table, dividends to assets do not decrease at 
all during the crisis.  
                                                            
6 Many of the quarterly Compustat variables, including dltis and dltry, are reported on a year-to-date basis. For these 
variables, in the second, third, and fourth quarter of each fiscal year, the quarterly value is calculated by subtracting 
the lagged value from the current value. 12 
 
Since firms are both repurchasing equity on net and issuing debt on net during the crisis, it is not 
surprising that leverage increases during the crisis. Here, leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt 
(dlttq) plus debt in current liabilities (dlcq), divided by assets (atq). Perhaps more surprising is the fact 
that leverage hardly moves during the credit boom. In the first quarter of 2005, the aggregate leverage 
ratio is 26.16%. Although not shown in the table, one year earlier, leverage is 27.17%. At the top of the 
credit boom, that ratio is 26.94%. Given the low credit spreads and the general availability of credit, such 
an outcome is surprising.  From the top of the boom to the peak of the crisis, leverage increases sharply. It 
increases almost 3 percentage points before the Lehman bankruptcy. After the Lehman bankruptcy, it 
increases by roughly 1.5 percentage points, with most of the increase taking place in the last quarter of 
2008 (though partly because of a decrease in the book value of assets, as we will discuss later). We also 
consider (but do not report) results for the net leverage ratio, defined as the sum of long-term debt (dlttq) 
plus debt in current liabilities (dlcq) minus cash (cheq), divided by assets (atq). This ratio increases 
through most of the boom and most of the crisis, but it falls in the first quarter of 2009. The reason the 
ratio increases throughout the boom is not because firms have more debt, but because they have less cash. 
The net leverage ratio hardly changes after Lehman, but leverage increases (though the increase is only 
marginally significant using the seasonality adjusted p-value). This evidence confirms that at the 
aggregate level firms increase debt and hoard much of the proceeds.  
One could be concerned that the cash hoarding simply reflects firms saving cash by reducing capital 
expenditures in anticipation of a deep recession. The evidence is not consistent with this hypothesis for 
the quarter immediately after Lehman; in that quarter there is no evidence that capital expenditures or 
R&D decrease (R&D not reported in table). Capital expenditures as a percent of assets do not decrease in 
2008 and are higher than in 2005. Though capital expenditures fall in the first quarter of 2009, so does 
operating cash flow. Operating cash flow has a pronounced seasonal component, so that it is generally 
much lower in the first quarter, but the fall in operating cash flow is significant when we use the 
seasonality adjusted p-value. Operating cash flow in the quarter after Lehman is hardly distinguishable 
from before Lehman. To obtain quarterly operating cash flow, we use the approach of Minton and 13 
 
Schrand (1999).  Operating cash flow is computed as sales (saleq) less cost of goods sold (cogsq) less 
selling, general and administrative expenses (xsgaq) less the change in working capital for the period, 
divided by total assets (atq). Working capital is current assets other than cash and short-term investments 
less current liabilities and is calculated as the sum of the non-missing amounts for accounts receivable 
(rectq), inventory (invtq), and other current assets (acoq) less the sum of the non-missing amounts for 
accounts payable (apq), income taxes payable (txpq), and other current liabilities (lcoq). If all components 
of working capital are missing in either the current quarter or the previous quarter, working capital and 
operating cash flow are both set equal to missing. Quarterly selling, general and administrative expenses 
exclude one-quarter of annual research and development costs (xrd) and advertising expenses (xad) when 
those data items are available. Thus, operating cash flow represents the cash flow available for 
discretionary investment.   
 
Section 2.2. Equally-weighted results 
We now turn to the equally-weighted results provided in Panel B of Table 1. While in the aggregate 
results we require firms to have data for all variables so that the denominator of the ratios is the same, for 
the equally-weighted results we construct averages for each variable separately and only require data for 
that variable. The number of observations reported is the number of firms for which we have cash and 
assets data.  We winsorize the equally-weighted results at the 1% and 99% levels, however, to mitigate 
the influence of outliers.  Firms decrease their cash holdings by 1.1 percentage points from the first 
quarter of 2005 to the top of the boom. The magnitude is similar to the 1.3 percentage point drop for the 
asset-weighted results. However, instead of a u-shape pattern of cash holdings, cash holdings fall from the 
top of the boom to the peak of the crisis by 1.78 percentage points. When examining the asset-weighted 
results, we noted that the cash ratio falls more during 2006 than it does in the first year of the crisis. This 
is clearly not the case for the equally-weighted ratio. In 2006, the equally-weighted cash ratio falls by 0.8 
percentage points. From the top of the boom to one year later, the cash ratio falls by 2.01 percentage 
points. This ratio increases by 0.58 percentage points after Lehman’s bankruptcy. In evaluating 14 
 
significance, we report p-values for paired t-tests using a sample of firms that are in existence before 
Lehman’s bankruptcy and at the peak of the crisis. For these firms, cash holdings increase by 0.70 
percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The evidence is consistent with the 
view that small firms use their precautionary cash holdings to cope with adverse shocks. This behavior 
does not show up in aggregate data because, while there are many small firms, their weight in the asset-
weighted average is small.  
The story of net debt issuance is substantially different after the Lehman bankruptcy when we 
examine the equally-weighted average instead of the asset-weighted average, but not in the first twelve 
months of the crisis. During the first twelve months of the crisis, net debt issuance is the same as during 
the last twelve months of the credit boom, irrespective of the measure of net debt issuance used. However, 
net debt issuance collapses after the failure of Lehman. For both measures of net debt issuance, we find 
that net debt issuance is negative in the two quarters after the failure of Lehman, i.e. firms are repaying 
debt. Further, the net total debt issuance measure (that includes short-term debt) has its lowest value in the 
sample in the first quarter of 2009, and the net long-term debt issuance measure has its second worst 
value in that quarter.  
In contrast to net debt issuance, net equity issuance falls sharply in the first year of the crisis. In the 
last twelve months of the boom, net equity issuance is roughly 1% per quarter; it drops to 0.5% in the first 
twelve months of the crisis. Strikingly, it turns negative in the quarter following the failure of Lehman, 
albeit by a small amount – this is the only quarter in our sample where equally-weighted net equity 
issuance is negative. In contrast, asset-weighted net equity issuance is typically negative because large 
firms repurchase more equity than they issue. There is no evidence that firms faced an exogenous 
curtailment of credit that led them to use equity issuance as a substitute for debt issuance.  
The cumulative shortfall in financing cash flow from the decrease in net equity issuance for the 
equally-weighted results is on average more than double the cumulative shortfall from the reduction in net 
debt issuance. To see this, suppose that from the start of the crisis to its peak, firms continued issuing 
equity at the same rate as in the last quarter of the credit boom. Over these seven quarters, firms would 15 
 
have issued equity corresponding to approximately 9.94% of assets.
7 Instead, they issue equity 
corresponding to 2.50% of assets, for a shortfall of 7.44% of assets. In contrast, had firms kept issuing 
debt as they did in the last quarter of the credit boom, they would have issued debt equal to approximately 
7.35% of assets. Instead, they issue debt equal to 3.79% of assets, for a shortfall of 3.56% of asset.  
Both net debt issuance and net equity issuance affect a firm’s leverage. Leverage increases by 1.2 
percentage points from the start of 2005 to the top of the credit boom. It then increases by 3.0 percentage 
points to the bottom of the financial crisis. However, leverage actually falls in the first quarter of 2009. 
Though average net leverage (not reported) is negative during the credit boom, it increases from 2005 
onward – i.e., becomes less negative – and turns positive in the first quarter of 2008.  
In sum, there are striking differences between the asset-weighted and equally-weighted averages. In 
the aggregate, net debt issuance is not affected by the crisis in the first twelve months and does not have 
extreme values in the two quarters after Lehman. However, with equally-weighted averages, debt 
issuance collapses after Lehman. Yet, strikingly, while equally-weighted debt issuance is unaffected in 
the first twelve months of the crisis, equally-weighted equity issuance falls in half during this period; in 
contrast, it stays unchanged for the asset-weighted average. This evidence suggests that financial policies 
evolved in sharply different ways for large and small firms during the financial crisis and that the 
financial crisis affected large and small firms in a markedly different way, a finding that is reminiscent of 
the conclusion of Bernanke (1983) that small firms bore the brunt of the Great Depression. Our results are 
also consistent with some of the evidence on investment for this crisis (e.g., Campello, Graham, and 
Harvey (2010) and Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010)) and with Iyer, Lopes, Peydró and Schoar (2010), 
who show that large Portuguese firms were not affected by the credit supply shock.  
The patterns observed after Lehman cannot be observed in the other recession in our sample 
associated with a credit crunch, namely the recession of 1990-1991. With that recession, there are only 
trivial changes in the asset-weighted and equally-weighted averages of the cash ratio. More specifically, 
                                                            
7 Note that, for simplicity, we use actual assets in these computations rather than what the assets would have been 
had equity issuance or debt issuance been different.  16 
 
the aggregate cash ratio falls by 0.06 percentage points from the third quarter of 1990 to the first quarter 
of 1991 and the equally-weighted average increases by 0.03 percentage points. Nothing like the post-
Lehman increase in cash holdings takes place in that recession. Such an increase does occur in the 
recession in our sample period not associated with a credit crunch, namely the 2001 recession. In that 
recession, the aggregate cash ratio increases by 0.62 percentage points and the equal-weighted cash ratio 
increase by 1.58 percentage points. However, just about all of the increase in the cash ratio takes place 
after September 11. The only other dramatic two-quarter increase in cash is from the third quarter of 1999 
to the first quarter of 2000, when there was much concern about the impact of passing the millennium 
mark on the functioning of computers.  
One concern is that our results could be influenced by the changing composition of the sample as 
firms cease to exist. Consequently, in untabulated results, we construct a sample of firms that exist 
continuously from the end of the first quarter of 2007 to the end of the first quarter of 2009. There are 
2,547 firms that satisfy this requirement.  The change in the aggregate cash ratio after Lehman’s failure 
for these firms is 1.47 percentage points as compared to 1.30 percentage points for the whole sample of 
firms. All the other patterns we discuss exist for these firms. We also verify that the dollar amount of cash 
holdings increases as well and find that, over the crisis, the aggregate dollar amount of cash held by firms 
that are continuously in existence increases by roughly $100 billion from the top of the boom to the peak 
of the crisis. For the whole sample, cash holdings increase by $89 billion in the two quarters after 
Lehman. We also investigate the medians for the sample used for the equally-weighted average. We find 
an increase in the median cash ratio after Lehman of 0.91 percentage points, compared to the mean 
change of 0.58 percentage points.  
 
Section 2.3.  Lines of Credit 
As discussed in our review of the literature, much attention has been paid to the role of credit lines 
and credit line drawdowns during the financial crisis. Using the approach of Sufi (2009), we construct a 
random sample of 300 firms as of the second quarter of 2007 to examine the economic importance of 17 
 
credit line drawdowns for firms meeting our sampling criteria. We then obtain data on line of credits 
available and drawdowns from 10-Qs and 10-Ks. Table 2 shows data for the asset-weighted sample and 
the equally-weighted sample. Not surprisingly given the existing literature, many firms have access to 
credit lines. Out of our 300 firms, 248 or 82.7% have credit lines at the start of the crisis. In our equally-
weighted sample, credit lines represent 18.0% of assets in the sample formation quarter, which is not very 
different from the 16.5% in the Sufi (2009) sample. The percentage of firms with credit lines having new 
drawdowns is typically less than 10% per quarter except in two quarters, the fourth quarter of 2007 when 
it is 34.4%, and the fourth quarter of 2008 when it is 30.6%. The next column shows the percentage of 
new drawdowns as a percentage of the total line of credit. We then estimate the importance of credit lines 
and credit lines drawdowns using asset-weighted averages and equally-weighted averages. Looking first 
at the asset-weighted sample, we find that the ratio of total lines of credit to total assets is 9.79% at the 
start of the crisis, which implies that credit lines are proportionately larger for smaller firms. The 
aggregate amount drawn down per quarter divided by total assets is less than 1% of assets in all quarters 
except one, the fourth quarter of 2007, when it is 1.46%. Yet, during that quarter, the ratio of cash 
holdings to total assets for our random sample falls. New drawdowns in the first quarter of 2009 are 
trivial. We turn next to the equally-weighted results. The equally-weighted average of the new 
drawdowns in the fourth quarter of 2008 is 1.44%. For comparison, the equally-weighted average cash 
ratio for our random sample increases by 0.30 percentage points during this quarter, from 18.6 to 18.9%.  
 
Section 3. Evidence for size, ratings, financially constrained and zero debt subsamples 
The contrast between the equally-weighted results and the asset-weighted results shows that financial 
policies of small and large firms evolve very differently during the financial crisis. To investigate this 
heterogeneity further, we turn to several subsamples. First, we consider firms of different sizes. Second, 
we examine financial policies of firms that differ in credit ratings – either the level or the existence of 
one. Third, we report results for firms that are financially constrained versus unconstrained immediately 18 
 
before the crisis, according to a modified version of the definition of Korajczyk and Levi (2003). Finally, 
we discuss results for a sample of firms with no debt. 
 
Section 3.1. Size groups 
We first examine the financial policies of firms by size.  Size quintiles are formed quarterly. We 
divide the NYSE firms into five quintiles based on assets at the beginning of the quarter. We then assign 
the non-NYSE firms to these quintiles.  Panel A of Table 3 provides data for the smallest and largest size 
quintiles, detailing changes in financial policies and the significance of these changes from pre- to post-
crisis and pre- to post-Lehman. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the equally-weighted average cash ratio 
for size quintiles in our sample. In the figure, we normalize the ratio to 1 at the start of 2005 for all size 
quintiles. It is immediately apparent that the experience of firms is quite different depending on their size. 
Firms in the three top quintiles decrease cash throughout the boom period and continue to do so until at 
least the first quarter of 2008.  However, the cash ratio increases after the failure of Lehman; the increase 
is especially sharp for the third and fifth quintile. In contrast, the two quintiles of the smallest firms have a 
substantially different experience. The decrease in cash for these firms during the boom period is 
minimal. However, they decrease their holdings sharply during the first year of the financial crisis, and 
increase their cash less during the two quarters following September 2008. 
We turn to net debt issuance next. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the broad measure of net total debt 
issuance for the five size quintiles. It is apparent for all size quintiles that there is no clear change from 
before the peak of the credit boom to the first year of the financial crisis. However, net debt issuance falls 
dramatically after Lehman and turns negative for all size groups except the largest firms, whose net debt 
issuance is essentially zero in the last quarter of the sample. For the four smallest size quintiles, the low 
net debt issuance after Lehman is lower than the lowest net debt issuance experienced during the boom. In 
contrast, for the largest firms, the net debt issuance for the first quarter of 2009 is actually higher than the 
net debt issuance in the first quarter of the boom period. Over our whole sample period, the four smallest 
size quintiles never experience a net debt issuance rate lower than the one they experience in the first 19 
 
quarter of 2009. Since small firms rely much more on bank loans than large firms, our evidence is 
consistent with the evidence in Becker and Ivashina (2010) of a serious supply shock to bank debt in 
2009. However, the situation of the largest firms is different as they experience lower net debt issuance 
for 18 quarters during the sample period.  
Figure 3 shows net equity issuance for the size quintiles. Equity issues are important for small firms. 
They have positive net equity issuance while the other size groups have negative net issuance – i.e., they 
buy back more equity more than they issue. In fact, in the four quarters before the start of the crisis, Panel 
A of Table 3 shows that small firms raise an average of 1.90% net equity a quarter and 0.83% net debt a 
quarter. In the first four quarters of the crisis, net equity issuance falls to 1.12% while net debt issuance 
remains unchanged at 0.83%. For the other size groups, net equity issuance increases in 2008, but that is 
because repurchases fall. It is only in the last two quarters of the sample that the other size groups 
experience net equity issuance ratios that are higher than the highest experienced during the credit boom. 
In contrast, net equity issuance by small firms plunges in early 2008. For three quarters in 2008 and the 
first quarter in 2009, small firms have the lowest net equity issuance of any quarter in our sample. In 
2008, only the second quarter has net equity issuance higher – but only slightly so – than the lowest net 
equity issuance of our sample before the crisis – and that quarter is the fourth quarter of 1990.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 3, book leverage increases sharply during the crisis for small firms. At 
the start of the crisis, their leverage is 15.9%; at the bottom, it is 18.3%. Small firms during that time have 
negative net leverage – i.e., they have more cash than debt. However, net leverage increases more than 
leverage because firms reduce their cash holdings. Leverage increases even more for the largest firms. For 
these firms, it is 26.5% at the top of the boom and increases to 30.7% at the bottom of the crisis, an 
increase of 4.2 percentage points. Net leverage is positive for large firms. It increases slightly less than 
leverage, from 17.4% to 21.1%, an increase of 3.7 percentage points. Perhaps not surprising at this point, 
the leverage of large firms increases by 2.2 percentage points in the quarter following Lehman’s failure 
and the associated increase in net leverage is 1.6 percentage points. In contrast, the increase in leverage of 
small firms is only 0.5 percentage points and net leverage falls by 0.1 percentage points. Note that if firms 20 
 
hoard the cash proceeds from new debt, net leverage falls  - assets (the denominator) increase due to the 
increase in cash while net debt (the numerator) is unchanged. Thus the net leverage decrease of small 
firms is more consistent with full hoarding of new debt than the net leverage increase of large firms.  
 
Section 3.2. Credit rating groups 
We next turn to subsets of our sample based on credit ratings in Table 3, Panel B. We divide firms 
quarterly into firms with an investment grade rating, a speculative rating, and no rating using the S&P 
long-term rating (splticrm) available on Compustat. The results are striking. Investment grade firms, as 
shown in Figure 4, have a higher cash ratio at the peak of the crisis than at the beginning of the crisis. 
Their cash ratio increases by 1.43 percentage points, from 8.04% to 9.47%. Another way to put this is 
that, measured as a fraction of assets, their cash at the peak of the crisis is 17.79% higher than at the 
beginning of the crisis. Almost all of the increase in cash takes place in the last two quarters – cash as a 
percent of assets increases by 1.19 percentage points in the last two quarters. Investment grade firms raise 
funds through debt each quarter, though in the last quarter the net debt issuance is a trivial 0.01%. They 
also are net repurchasers of equity throughout the crisis. Not surprisingly, their leverage increases 
throughout the crisis. From the end of Q3 2008 to the end of Q1 2009, leverage increases by 1.08 
percentage points, but net leverage increases by only 0.02 percentage points. Consequently, investment 
grade firms increase debt but hoard much of the proceeds.  
When we examine speculative grade firms, the increase in cash throughout the crisis is small as it is 
only 0.27 percentage points. However, the increase from the end of Q3 2008 to the end of Q1 2009 is 0.83 
percentage points. Debt issuance is negative for these firms in the last two quarters of the sample. 
Speculative-grade firms raise equity on net each quarter, but the amount is very small after Lehman. 
Leverage increases by 2.95 percentage points after Lehman even though net debt issuance issuance is 
negative.   
Finally, non-rated firms have a dramatically different experience from the firms with a rating and 
hence with access to public markets, which supports further the conclusion of Faulkender and Petersen 21 
 
(2006) that access to public debt markets has an important impact on firm financial policies. The cash 
ratio of these firms is 26.77% at the start of the crisis. That ratio is almost the same as the one they have at 
the beginning of 2005 when it is 27.67%. At the bottom of the crisis, these firms have a cash ratio of 
24.14%, so their cash ratio falls by 2.63 percentage points. These firms increase their cash holdings after 
Lehman’s failure as well. The unrated firms issue debt on net in every quarter except for the last two. The 
net debt issuance of these firms is actually larger in the first year of the crisis than in the last year of the 
boom – an average of 0.69% per quarter in the last year of the boom versus 0.83% in the first year of the 
crisis. In contrast, net equity issuance falls from an average of 1.52% to 0.80% from the last four quarters 
of the boom to the first four quarters of the crisis. Leverage increases for these firms during the crisis as 
well, but the increase in leverage after September 2008 is only 0.57 percentage points. The increase in net 
leverage over that period is 0.14 percentage points.  Unrated firms have negative net leverage. From the 
start of the crisis to its peak, the net leverage of unrated firms increases from -11.10% to -5.75%.   
 
Section 3.3. Financially constrained firms 
It is not uncommon in the literature to define financially constrained firms to be small firms or firms 
without a rating.
8 Table 3 shows that these firms decrease their cash holdings during the financial crisis, 
but nevertheless experience an increase in cash holdings after Lehman. We also compare cash holdings 
between a sample of firms that are financially constrained and firms that are not constrained at the top of 
the credit boom, using a modified version of the definition of Korajczyk and Levi (2003). We define a 
firm to be financially constrained if it (1) does not pay dividends, (2) does not have net equity 
repurchases, (3) does not have a credit rating, and (4) has a Tobin’s q greater than one (defined as the 
market value of the assets divided by the book value, where market value of assets is book value minus 
book equity plus market value of equity).  With our definition of financial constraint, we attempt to 
isolate firms that have growth opportunities that outpace their internally generated cash and that have not 
had access to public debt markets.  We find that constrained firms have an average cash ratio of 35.77% 
                                                            
8 See, for instance, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004). 22 
 
at the end of the credit boom. The cash ratio of these firms falls sharply during the crisis, to 31.09% at the 
peak of the crisis. Yet, the cash ratio of these firms increases after Lehman by 0.36 percentage points on 
average. Before the crisis, these firms are large issuers of equity and their average net equity issuance 
dwarfs their average net debt issuance. In the second quarter of 2007, their equity sales amount to 3.13% 
of assets. Equity sales are sharply lower in 2008 and early 2009. In the quarter after Lehman, they amount 
to 0.55%. Since the capital expenditures of these firms stay unchanged in the first year of the crisis, they 
must be using their cash holdings to offset the decrease in equity sales. Unconstrained firms experience a 
decrease in the cash ratio during the crisis as well, but they have a much larger increase in their cash ratio 
after Lehman, since their cash ratio increases from 24.51% to 25.86%, or by 1.35 percentage points.  
 
Section 3.4. Zero debt groups 
To understand the role of debt better in the evolution of firm financial policies during the crisis, we 
construct two samples of firms that have no debt, which we define as firms with zero leverage. We do not 
tabulate the results. The first sample is composed of firms that have zero leverage at the start of a quarter. 
These firms could borrow during that quarter and end the quarter with debt. We would expect the 
financial policies of such firms to be the least affected by changes in the credit markets among the 
subsamples we have considered. These firms have an extremely high cash ratio of 41.95% at the end of 
the credit boom. The cash ratio of these firms falls to 38.32% at the end of the third quarter of 2008. 
However, these firms hoard cash after Lehman as their cash ratio increases to 40.27%, an increase of 1.96 
percentage points, which is the largest percentage point increase among the subsamples we have 
considered. This increase, representing an increase in cash holdings of 10.70%, is statistically significant. 
Further, these firms experience a dramatic decrease in net equity issuance. Strikingly, net equity issuance 
for these firms as a percentage of assets is 2.05% in the last quarter of the credit boom. Yet, it is negative 
for each quarter in 2008. Net equity issuance for firms with no debt is negative in one quarter prior to 
2008, the third quarter of 2002. There are no consecutive quarters with negative net equity issuance for 
such firms before 2008. The second sample is a sample of firms that have no debt at the end of the 23 
 
quarter. Obviously, this creates a bias in the results. However, the point of this sample is to consider firms 
that do not increase their cash because of debt issuance. Because these firms have no debt at the end of 
the quarter, they typically have negative net debt issuance during the quarter. These firms experience an 
increase in the cash ratio after Lehman’s failure of 1.19 percentage points. This increase is statistically 
significant as well and represents an increase in cash holdings of 15.38%. It follows that the increase in 
cash holdings is not tied to credit line drawdowns. These firms also experience a dramatic drop in net 
equity issuance.   
 
Section 3.5. Sources of changes in the cash to assets ratio 
To better understand why the cash ratio changes, we decompose the change in the cash ratio using a 
first-order approximation as follows:  
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where C(t) is cash at date t and A(t) corresponds to assets at date t. This decomposition shows that the 
cash ratio can increase even though cash holdings fall if assets fall sufficiently. We compute the ratios 
[C(t)-C(t-1)]/A(t-1) and [A(t)-A(t-1)]/A(t-1) for all our subsamples. Strikingly, changes in cash are 
negative for the equally-weighted ratio but not for the asset-weighted ratio in the quarter after Lehman’s 
failure. However, for the equally-weighted ratio, the asset growth ratio is also negative, so that that the 
value of assets falls. It turns out that the negative change in cash is driven by the smallest firms and the 
unrated firms,. For all the other groups, the change in cash is positive. The drop in assets after Lehman’s 
failure is striking. For the equally-weighted average, assets decrease by 5.44% in the last quarter of 2008. 
We examine the decreases in assets for that quarter across firms and find that a major source of decreases 
in assets are write-downs of goodwill. In 2008, firms adopt FASB 157 which requires them to use an exit 
value for estimates of fair value. We would expect that such estimates would have fallen substantially in 
the last quarter of 2008 as the stock market fell dramatically. In an examination of goodwill impairments 
for the last quarter of 2008, not only is the average impairment large (10.07% of assets for the firms that 24 
 
report such impairments) but the number of firms that report impairments is unusually large (from 
2005Q1 to 2007Q2, the highest number of firms reporting impairments in a quarter is 165, but that 
number is 666 in Q4 of 2008). 
 
Section 4. Predicted versus unpredicted changes in financial policies 
So far, we have shown that the first year of the financial crisis is not associated with lower net debt 
issuance by firms, but is associated with lower net new equity issuance by smaller and unrated firms. 
Cash holdings fall for smaller firms and firms with a non-investment grade rating or no rating. After the 
collapse of Lehman, however, firms hoard cash, but much more so for larger firms and investment grade 
firms, and net debt issuance becomes exceptionally low at the peak of the crisis for all but large and 
investment grade firms. In this section, we investigate whether these changes can be explained by the 
evolution of firm characteristics using models from the recent literature.  Our approach is to use these 
models to predict financial policies and to evaluate whether departures from these predicted values during 
the crisis, the abnormal values for these financial policies, are significant. None of these models were 
developed using quarterly data because quarterly data is not typically used in corporate finance research. 
Consequently, when we find that changes in a financial policy cannot be explained by fundamentals, it 
could be because the models we use are poorly specified when using quarterly data. However, we do find 
that our estimates of these models are consistent with estimates using yearly data. We also estimate the 
models using lagged values for firm characteristics, and the results we find are supportive of the results 
we report. 
 
Section 4.1. Predicted and unpredicted cash holdings.  
We start by investigating abnormal cash. Our model for expected cash is the model used in Bates, 
Kahle, and Stulz (2009), but we estimate this model using quarterly data. This model allows for a 
transaction demand for cash as well as a precautionary demand for cash. The dependent variable is the 
cash ratio, and the following explanatory variables are used: the standard deviation of cash flows at the 25 
 
industry level (using the two-digit SIC level), the market-to-book ratio, the log of firm size, the ratio of 
cash flow to assets, the ratio of net working capital to assets, capital expenditures to assets, leverage, 
R&D to assets, a dummy variable for missing data on R&D, dividends to assets, acquisitions to assets, net 
equity issuance to assets, and net debt issuance to assets.
9 Because we use quarterly data, we add to the 
model indicator variables for the second, third, and fourth quarters to accommodate seasonal effects.  
We estimate the model from the first quarter of 1995 through the first quarter of 2009. We also 
estimate the model over our whole sample period and our inferences are similar. Given that the cash ratio 
increases over time, we prefer to use a shorter sample period that reflects better cash holding patterns over 
the credit boom and the financial crisis. However, it turns out that whether we start the sample in 1983 or 
in 1998 makes no substantive difference for our conclusions. We estimate the model for all firms and then 
separately for the five size quintiles and for the three ratings groups. We use indicator variables for each 
quarter starting in the first quarter of 2005 to capture average abnormal cash (i.e., the cash ratio minus the 
predicted cash ratio). Since we know that cash holdings increase dramatically over time and that only part 
of the increase is explained by the firm characteristics typically used in models explaining cash holdings 
(see Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)), we expect average abnormal cash to be positive, at least early in the 
credit boom period. Our interest is in how abnormal cash changes rather than in the level of these 
abnormal cash holdings.  
Table 4, Panel A, reports the estimated regressions. Regression (1) shows estimates of the model for 
the whole sample of industrial firms. The independent variables take values that are consistent with 
estimates for the aggregate sample in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). The seasonal indicator variables are 
significant for the fourth quarter for the investment grade and unrated firms. We see that the abnormal 
cash ratio is roughly constant and significantly positive during the credit boom period. It falls in half in 
the first three quarters of 2008 and then increases sharply from 1.54% to 4.60% from the Lehman 
bankruptcy to the peak of the crisis. Consequently, the increase in the cash ratio after the Lehman 
                                                            
9 Not all firms report R&D on a quarterly basis. When a firm does not report R&D quarterly, we use the annual 
R&D, divided by four, as an estimate of R&D in each quarter of that year. Results are similar if we set R&D as 
missing for these firms. 26 
 
bankruptcy is even larger after accounting for changes in fundamentals. Abnormal cash is significantly 
higher at the peak of the financial crisis than at the top of the credit boom.  
The next two regressions in Table 4, Panel A, report results for the smallest and largest size quintiles. 
We also examine but do not report estimates for the other size quintiles. Almost all coefficients on the 
independent variables are significant and consistent in sign across size quintiles except for the coefficients 
of operating cash flow to assets and size. The indicator variable for the fourth quarter is positive and 
significant, except for the middle and largest quintiles. There are sharp differences in the evolution of 
abnormal cash across firm sizes. Abnormal cash at the top of the credit boom is not significantly different 
from abnormal cash at the peak of the financial crisis for the two smallest size quintiles, but this result is 
due to the increase in the cash ratio after September 2008. More specifically, abnormal cash drops in the 
first year of the crisis for the two quintiles of smallest firms. For the top three size quintiles, abnormal 
cash increases significantly over the crisis. More specifically, abnormal cash increases by 2.83 percentage 
points during the crisis for the largest firms. After Lehman’s failure, abnormal cash increases significantly 
for all but the two smallest size quintiles, but the increase in abnormal cash takes place almost exclusively 
in the first quarter of 2009. At the end of that quarter, firms in the three top quintiles of firm size have 
extremely large abnormal cash.  
Regressions (4) to (6) show the results for the three ratings groups. For investment grade firms, 
abnormal cash falls during the credit boom and keeps falling until the end of 2007. After that, abnormal 
cash increases. Not surprisingly, abnormal cash for investment grade firms is significantly higher at the 
peak of the crisis compared to the top of the boom and compared to the third quarter of 2008. Abnormal 
cash increases by 6.56 percentage points over the crisis, but most of this increase occurs in the last quarter 
of the sample period. The increase in abnormal cash is much smaller for firms with a speculative rating. 
For these firms, abnormal cash becomes significantly negative during the crisis and is positive at the peak 
of the crisis, so that it increases by 2.27 percentage points after Lehman, but the latter increase is not 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.11). Finally, firms without a rating have positive abnormal cash 
throughout the credit boom and the financial crisis, but their abnormal cash has a u-shape during the 27 
 
crisis. The abnormal cash of these firms is similar at the end of the credit boom and at the peak of the 
financial crisis. However, their abnormal cash more than doubles after September 2008.   
It follows from Table 4, Panel A, that abnormal cash for large and investment grade firms increases 
even more following Lehman than the cash ratio itself. Such a result implies that fundamentals typically 
used in cash holding regressions cannot explain the change in cash holdings in these firms after the failure 
of Lehman. However, changes in fundamentals seem to explain changes in cash holdings for the smaller 
firms. In the literature, small firms and firms without ratings are often viewed as firms that are financially 
constrained. These firms actually do not experience an increase in abnormal cash over the crisis, but they 
do not experience a significant decline either. The reason that constrained firms do not experience a 
decline in abnormal cash is due to the increase in the cash ratio following Lehman. Though we do not 
report the results in the table, we also estimate a regression that allows abnormal cash to evolve 
differently for constrained and unconstrained firms, where the definition of constrained firms is the 
modified Levi-Korajczyk (2003) definition of financially constrained firms discussed earlier. For 
unconstrained firms, abnormal cash increases from 1.71% at the top of the credit boom to 4.00% at the 
peak of the crisis, but before increasing after Lehman, abnormal cash falls to 0.59% in the second quarter 
of 2008. The abnormal cash of constrained firms exceeds the abnormal cash of unconstrained firms by 
5.46% at the top of the credit boom and this excess falls to 4.02% at the peak of the crisis. This result is 
consistent with the evidence in Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) that constrained firms used their 
abnormal cash holdings early in the crisis. However, the abnormal cash of constrained firms increases by 
3.07 percentage points after Lehman’s failure, showing that consumption of abnormal cash stops in 
September 2008.   
Though the model we estimate for cash makes the cash ratio of a firm depend on the uncertainty of its 
environment, the uncertainty measure we use may not be sufficiently forward looking and the absence of 
a forward-looking measure of uncertainty may explain why fundamentals do not seem to capture the 
increase in the cash ratio after Lehman’s failure. To explore this possibility, we estimate cash regressions 
(but do not reproduce them in a table) where we add the VIX at the beginning of the quarter and the 28 
 
change in the VIX during the quarter as forward-looking measures of economic uncertainty. The VIX is 
often used as a measure of risk-aversion and is sometimes viewed as an investor fear gauge (see Durand, 
Lim, and Zumwalt (2007)). The addition of the VIX variables does not change our conclusions. 
Surprisingly, the VIX variables are not even significant when added to a regression for the whole sample.  
 
Section 4.2. Predicted and unpredicted debt and equity issuance. 
To estimate abnormal debt and equity issuance, we follow Fama and French (2008). We estimate 
their models from 1995 to 2009. However, they estimate their models using annual data, and some of the 
data they use is not available with quarterly data. Consequently, we modify some variable definitions to 
account for the quarterly data limitations and add other variables.  Our corresponding independent 
variables include the percentage change in assets from the previous quarter, operating cash flow to assets, 
dividends to assets, a dummy variable equal to one if the firms pays dividends, lagged leverage, an 
indicator variable equal to one if book equity is negative, the lagged market capitalization, the market-to-
book ratio (computed as book assets minus book equity plus market equity divided by assets), lagged cash 
over assets, lagged debt in current liabilities over assets, R&D over assets, and capital expenditures over 
assets. However, we lag the independent variables by one additional quarter to avoid having a mechanical 
relation between our independent variables and net issuance. Finally, as with the cash regressions, we 
allow for seasonality. The high yield credit spread is 2.65% at the peak of the credit boom and 10.63% at 
the end of Q1 2009. At the end of 2008, the high yield credit spread is at 13.04%. We would expect that 
such a dramatic increase in credit spreads would have an adverse impact on the demand for debt. To 
assess the role of the increase in credit spreads on debt and equity issuance, we also estimate our 
regressions with the intermediate term treasury rate and the credit spread of high yield debt over the 
intermediate term treasury rate. We only report the results without the credit spreads in the table, but also 
discuss untabulated results that include the credit spreads. 
As for cash holdings, we start with the regressions for the whole sample. Though we estimate the 
regressions for both definitions of debt issuance, we focus on the broadest definition and do not report in 29 
 
Panel B of Table 4 the estimates for the narrower definition. Regression (1) is estimated using all 
industrial firms. The estimates of the coefficients on firm characteristics are generally unsurprising. The 
quarterly indicator variables are mostly insignificant. The unpredicted part of net debt issuance is negative 
and significant in the two quarters after Lehman, but at no other time during the financial crisis. The 
results are similar for the narrower definition of net long-term issuance debt. When we turn to size and 
investment rating groups, we find that in the last quarter of 2008, investment grade firms and large firms 
do not have abnormal net debt issuance. However, in the first quarter of 2009, all subsamples have 
significant negative abnormal net debt issuance. When we take into account credit spreads, firms have 
positive abnormal net debt issuance in the last quarter of 2008 (not reported). 
Panel C of Table 4 shows regressions estimating net equity issuance. The independent variables are 
the same as the ones used in the net debt issuance model. The first regression provides estimates for the 
whole sample. Estimates of abnormal net equity issuance are significantly negative early in 2008, but not 
after Lehman. When we turn to subsamples, we find that the negative abnormal equity issuance is 
concentrated among small firms and unrated firms. These firms have significantly negative abnormal 
equity issuance throughout 2008. There is no evidence, therefore, that these firms somehow use equity to 
make up for abnormal net debt issuance brought about by a curtailment in the supply of debt – these firms 
issue abnormally low amounts of equity before they issue abnormally low amounts of debt, and when 
they issue abnormally low amounts of debt they do not issue more equity.      
 
Section 5. Conclusion. 
We examine financial policies of firms throughout the credit boom and from the start of the financial 
crisis to its peak to understand what these policies tell us about the impact of the financial crisis and about 
the consequences of an exogenous supply shock to credit resulting from an unexpected financial crisis. 
Our findings raise important questions about the gravity of such a supply shock. First, there is no 
evidence of a systemic supply shock before the fall of Lehman. More specifically, industrial firms do not 
show any evidence of a decrease in net debt issuance before the fall of Lehman. Second, in the first year 30 
 
of the crisis, small and unrated firms do decrease their cash holdings. However, they do not borrow less 
but instead raise less equity financing. It is striking that the drop in equity financing for small and unrated 
firms precedes the drop in debt financing. Third, debt financing drops sharply after Lehman for all types 
of firms. Yet, the drop for large firms does not lead them to experience a level of debt financing that is 
exceptionally low even at the peak of the financial crisis. In contrast, the level of net debt financing for 
small and unrated firms is exceptionally low in the first quarter of 2009. Fourth, large firms more than 
make up the decrease in debt financing through a reduction in share repurchases. As a result, they are able 
to raise their cash holdings sharply after Lehman, an increase that we would not expect to see if these 
firms had been starved for cash because of the inability to borrow, but that is consistent with an increase 
in the demand for precautionary cash holdings because of exceptionally uncertain times – including 
uncertainty about the future availability of credit. Fifth, from the start of the crisis to its peak, the 
cumulative loss of financing resulting from the decrease in equity financing for small and unrated firms is 
more than twice the cumulative loss of financing resulting from the decrease in debt financing for these 
firms. Sixth, all firm types increased their cash to asset ratio after Lehman – even firms that made no use 
of debt.   
The hoarding of cash following the events of the third quarter of 2008 and the economically large 
changes in net equity issuance suggest that the reaction of firms to the financial crisis is more complicated 
than the narrative of the economy being adversely affected as a result of firms being unable to invest 
because they were unable to borrow. At the very least, fear and increased uncertainty played at least as 
much of a role in financing policies as direct borrowing constraints. Further, it is hard to make sense of 
the decrease in equity issuance without taking into account that firms faced a higher cost of equity capital 
and/or poorer investment opportunities well before they started raising substantially less cash through 
debt. Future research should investigate why equity financing flows are so important during the crisis. 
Another fruitful topic for future research is whether our aggregate results obscure problems in the 
allocation of credit across firms.  
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Table 1: Financial Policies Statistics During the Credit Boom and the Financial Crisis  
 
Panel A: Financial Policies Using Asset-weighted Averages 
This table examines the time series of firm financial policy variables, on an asset-weighted basis, from the first 
quarter of 2005 to the first quarter of 2009.  We begin with quarterly data collected from the CRSP/Compustat 
Merged (CCM) Fundamentals Quarterly database for 1980-2009. We delete observations with negative total assets 
(ATQ), negative sales (SALEQ), negative cash and marketable securities (CHQ), cash and marketable securities 
greater than total assets, and firms not incorporated in the U.S.  We also eliminate all financial firms, which we 
define as firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and utilities, which we define as firms with SIC codes 
between 4900 and 4949.  LT stands for long-term debt. Other variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
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Leverage Capex  Operating 
cash flow 
2005Q1  3444 0.1042 0.0011 0.0013  -0.0039 0.2616 0.0106 0.0225 
2005Q2  3413 0.1019  -0.0015 0.0002  -0.0056 0.2603 0.0126 0.0377 
2005Q3  3381 0.1018 0.0026 0.0036  -0.0057 0.2571 0.0129 0.0316 
2005Q4  3317 0.1053 0.0043 0.0061  -0.0072 0.2548 0.0146 0.0682 
2006Q1  3347 0.0971 0.0073 0.0090  -0.0062 0.2620 0.0128 0.0345 
2006Q2  3325 0.0963 0.0047 0.0079  -0.0102 0.2628 0.0141 0.0415 
2006Q3  3318 0.0955 0.0058 0.0067  -0.0095 0.2644 0.0141 0.0503 
2006Q4  3225 0.0964 0.0015 0.0067  -0.0058 0.2622 0.0159 0.0499 
2007Q1  3240 0.0956 0.0068 0.0071  -0.0074 0.2659 0.0133 0.0356 
2007Q2  3198 0.0949 0.0077 0.0087  -0.0110 0.2694 0.0143 0.0458 
2007Q3  3179 0.0962 0.0064 0.0097  -0.0117 0.2732 0.0142 0.0447 
2007Q4  3122 0.0955 0.0080 0.0098  -0.0091 0.2741 0.0158 0.0469 
2008Q1  3167 0.0890 0.0061 0.0097  -0.0088 0.2860 0.0136 0.0362 
2008Q2  3101 0.0890 0.0071 0.0067  -0.0059 0.2862 0.0146 0.0442 
2008Q3  3078 0.0889 0.0061 0.0043  -0.0065 0.2922 0.0155 0.0442 
2008Q4  3000 0.0981 0.0035 0.0009  -0.0028 0.3058 0.0156 0.0484 
2009Q1  2971 0.1018 0.0077  -0.0019  -0.0019 0.3072 0.0111 0.0236 
Avg 1983-2004  0.0675 0.0036 0.0065  -0.0009 0.2922 0.0183 0.0451 
Avg 1990-2004  0.0666 0.0036 0.0056  -0.0008 0.3024 0.0171 0.0454 
Min  0.0486 -0.0057 -0.0164 -0.0076 0.2201 0.0097 0.0204 
Max  0.1077 0.0144 0.0460 0.0061 0.3278 0.0295 0.0608 
Std.  Dev.  0.0149 0.0034 0.0077 0.0021 0.0259 0.0040 0.0076 
Post crisis vs pre crisis 
Avg  (2007Q3-2008Q2)  0.0924 0.0069 0.0090 -0.0089  0.2799  0.0146  0.0430 
Avg  (2006Q3-2007Q2)  0.0956 0.0055 0.0073 -0.0084  0.2655  0.0144  0.0454 
Difference  -0.0032 0.0014 0.0017  -0.0005 0.0144 0.0002  -0.0024 
seasonality adjusted p-values  0.6484  0.5044 0.7192 0.8116 0.2413 0.9365 0.6943 
Post  vs pre Lehman 
2009Q1 0.1018  0.0077  -0.0019  -0.0019 0.3072 0.0111 0.0236 
2008Q3  0.0889 0.0061 0.0043  -0.0065 0.2922 0.0155 0.0442 
2007Q2  0.0949 0.0077 0.0087  -0.0110 0.2694 0.0143 0.0458 
Difference (2009Q1 - 2008Q3)  0.0130  0.0016  -0.0062 0.0046 0.0150  -0.0044  -0.0206 
Newey West test p-values  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Seasonality adjusted p-values  0.0433  0.7082 0.2423 0.0758 0.1118 0.0842 0.0274 
Difference (2009Q1 - 2007Q2)  0.0070  0.0000  -0.0106 0.0091 0.0378  -0.0032  -0.0222 
Newey West test p-values  0.0000  0.6400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Seasonality adjusted p-values  0.4982  0.9995 0.1844 0.0009 0.0675 0.3788 0.0234 
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Table 1, Panel B:  Financial Policies Using Equally-Weighted Averages 
This table examines the means of the time series of firm financial policy variables, on an equal-weighted basis, from 
the first quarter of 2005 to the first quarter of 2009.  We begin with quarterly data collected from the 
CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) Fundamentals Quarterly database for 1980-2009. We delete observations with 
negative total assets (ATQ), negative sales (SALEQ), negative cash and marketable securities (CHQ), cash and 
marketable securities greater than total assets, and firms not incorporated in the U.S.  We also eliminate all financial 
firms, which we define as firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and utilities, which we define as firms with 
SIC codes between 4900 and 4949.  LT stands for long-term debt. Other variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. 
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Leverage Capex Operating 
cash flow 
2005Q1  3597 0.2302 0.0046 0.0053 0.0118 0.1903 0.0123 0.0255 
2005Q2  3578 0.2242 0.0019 0.0035 0.0078 0.1909 0.0137 0.0331 
2005Q3  3539 0.2237 0.0042 0.0065 0.0120 0.1901 0.0138 0.0333 
2005Q4  3501 0.2303 0.0034 0.0041 0.0141 0.1899 0.0148 0.0453 
2006Q1  3495 0.2253 0.0051 0.0064 0.0152 0.1905 0.0138 0.0244 
2006Q2  3478 0.2229 0.0060 0.0070 0.0104 0.1903 0.0150 0.0300 
2006Q3  3475 0.2182 0.0052 0.0083 0.0048 0.1949 0.0146 0.0313 
2006Q4  3413 0.2222 0.0056 0.0061 0.0143 0.1966 0.0153 0.0409 
2007Q1  3389 0.2194 0.0075 0.0081 0.0087 0.1996 0.0140 0.0245 
2007Q2  3357 0.2193 0.0079 0.0105 0.0142 0.2028 0.0150 0.0301 
2007Q3  3323 0.2179 0.0065 0.0092 0.0079 0.2053 0.0150 0.0313 
2007Q4  3293 0.2208 0.0063 0.0086 0.0083 0.2077 0.0156 0.0407 
2008Q1  3312 0.2043 0.0084 0.0104 0.0005 0.2140 0.0137 0.0226 
2008Q2  3250 0.1992 0.0054 0.0062 0.0033 0.2156 0.0149 0.0326 
2008Q3  3220 0.1957 0.0045 0.0081 0.0021 0.2230 0.0144 0.0320 
2008Q4 3160  0.2008  -0.0002  -0.0004  (0.0000) 0.2349 0.0131 0.0305 
2009Q1 3126  0.2015  -0.0015  -0.0045 0.0030 0.2331 0.0097 0.0131 
Avg 1983-2004  0.1605 0.0049 0.0086 0.0125 0.2417 0.0184 0.0272 
Avg 1990-2004  0.1721 0.0044 0.0074 0.0138 0.2317 0.0172 0.0288 
Min 0.1215  -0.0020  -0.0013  0.0027 0.1912 0.0105 0.0120 
Max  0.2316 0.0144 0.0197 0.0354 0.2830 0.0275 0.0426 
Std. Dev.  0.0319  0.0034  0.0050 0.0055 0.0239 0.0035 0.0070 
Post crisis vs pre crisis 
Avg (2007Q3-2008Q2)  0.2105  0.0066  0.0086 0.0050 0.2107 0.0148 0.0318 
Avg (2006Q3-2007Q2)  0.2198  0.0065  0.0082 0.0105 0.1985 0.0147 0.0317 
Difference -0.0092  0.0001  0.0004 -0.0055  0.0122  0.0001  0.0001 
Ttest  pre vs post crisis  0.0034  0.8549 0.6294 0.0001 0.0011 0.7855 0.9726 
Post  vs pre Lehman 
2009Q1 0.2015  -0.0015  -0.0045  0.0030 0.2331 0.0097 0.0131 
2008Q3  0.1957 0.0045 0.0081 0.0021 0.2230 0.0144 0.0320 
2007Q2  0.2193 0.0079 0.0105 0.0142 0.2028 0.0150 0.0301 
Diff. (2009Q1 - 2008Q3)  0.0058  -0.0060  -0.0126 0.0010 0.0101  -0.0046  -0.0189 
Paired Diff.   0.0070  -0.0057  -0.0124 0.0013 0.0161  -0.0049  -0.0203 
Ttest 2008Q3=2009Q1*  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 0.1426 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Diff. (2009Q1 - 2007Q2)  -0.0178  -0.0094  -0.0150 -0.0112  0.0303 -0.0053 -0.0171 
Paired Diff.   -0.0196  -0.0096  -0.0163 -0.0109  0.0348 -0.0061 -0.0202 
Ttest 2007Q2=2009Q1  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on Lines of Credit 
This table examines data on lines of credit for a random sample of 300 firms chosen as of the second 
quarter of 2007.  We follow the approach in Sufi (2009) in sampling the firms.  % new drawdown is the 
percentage of firms in that quarter that draw down a line of credit.  Drawdown to loc is the ratio of the 
amount drawn down to the firm’s total line of credit.  Line_assets is the ratio of lines of credit to total 
assets.  Draw_assets is the ratio of new drawdowns in that quarter to total assets. 
      % new  drawdown    Aggregate sample    Equal-weighted sample   
DATACQTR _FREQ_  drawdown  to  loc   line_assets  draw_assets line_assets draw_assets 
2007Q1 283  0.0565  0.1371  0.0940  0.0003  0.1764  0.0015 
2007Q2 300  0.0700  0.2017  0.0979  0.0009  0.1804  0.0037 
2007Q3 293  0.0580  0.1008  0.0969  0.0010  0.1755  0.0017 
2007Q4 279  0.3441  0.2564  0.0984  0.0146  0.1757  0.0217 
2008Q1 277  0.0866  0.3039  0.0967  0.0020  0.1718  0.0056 
2008Q2 265  0.0528  0.1205  0.0901  0.0004  0.1719  0.0012 
2008Q3 262  0.0763  0.2685  0.0932  0.0031  0.1770  0.0053 
2008Q4 252  0.3056  0.1921  0.1023  0.0070  0.1921  0.0144 
2009Q1 246  0.0610  0.1795  0.1041  0.0007  0.1707  0.0014 
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Table 3: Financial Policies by Size, Debt Rating, and Financial Constraint Groupings 
This table examines the means of the time series of firm financial policy variables, on an equal-weighted basis, from 
the first quarter of 2005 to the first quarter of 2009 for firms categorized according to size, debt, rating, and financial 
constraint.    Panel A examines size quintiles, which are formed quarterly by dividing all NYSE firms into five 
quintiles based on assets; we then assign the non-NYSE firms to these quintiles. Panel B examines firms by debt 
rating.  We divide firms quarterly into firms with an investment grade rating, a speculative rating, and no rating 
using the S&P long-term rating (splticrm) available on Compustat. Panel C examines financially constrained vs. 
unconstrained firms.  We examine whether a firm is financially constrained as of the second quarter of 2007, and 
define a firm to be constrained if it (1) does not pay dividends, (2) does not have net equity repurchases, (3) does not 
have a credit rating, and (4) has a Tobin’s q greater than one (defined as the market value of the assets divided by 
the book value, where market value of assets is book value minus book equity plus market value of equity).   
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Panel A:  Smallest vs Largest Firms 











Leverage Capex Operating 
cash flow 
Avg 1983-2004  0.1946 0.0047 0.0092 0.0180 0.2152 0.0181 0.0200 
Avg 1990-2004  0.2107 0.0040 0.0076 0.0199 0.1982 0.0168 0.0222 
Min  0.1430  -0.0012  -0.0011 0.0055 0.1503 0.0049 0.0049 
Max  0.2857 0.0120 0.0194 0.0487 0.2660 0.0394 0.0394 
Std.  Dev.  0.0412 0.0034 0.0052 0.0075 0.0347 0.0076 0.0076 
Post crisis vs pre crisis 
Avg  (2007Q3-2008Q2)  0.2697 0.0065 0.0083 0.0112 0.1646 0.0141 0.0241 
Avg  (2006Q3-2007Q2)  0.2785 0.0064 0.0083 0.0190 0.1554 0.0140 0.0247 
Difference  -0.0087 0.0001 0.0000  -0.0079 0.0093 0.0002  -0.0006 
Ttest    0.0833 0.8794 0.9997 0.0001 0.0316 0.7639 0.5152 
Post vs pre Lehman 
2009Q1  0.2572  -0.0020  -0.0025 0.0052 0.1827 0.0085 0.0046 
2008Q3  0.2514 0.0040 0.0086 0.0054 0.1779 0.0132 0.0248 
2007Q2  0.2785 0.0072 0.0104 0.0254 0.1585 0.0141 0.0212 
Diff.  (2009Q1-2008Q3)  0.0058 -0.0060 -0.0111 -0.0002  0.0048 -0.0047 -0.0202 
Paired  Diff.    0.0050 -0.0055 -0.0108  0.0000  0.0141 -0.0049 -0.0217 
Ttest  2008Q3=2009Q1*  0.0139 0.0001 0.0001 0.9880 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Diff. (2009Q1-2007Q2)  -0.0213  -0.0092  -0.0129 -0.0202  0.0242 -0.0056 -0.0166 
Paired  Diff.    -0.0316 -0.0094 -0.0143 -0.0214  0.0328 -0.0063 -0.0196 
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Leverage Capex Operating 
cash flow 
Avg 1983-2004  0.0631 0.0031 0.0052  -0.0014 0.2940 0.0189 0.0463 
Avg 1990-2004  0.0622 0.0029 0.0044  -0.0016 0.3016 0.0178 0.0461 
Min  0.0476 -0.0054 -0.0114 -0.0100  0.2347  0.0096  0.0259 
Max  0.1069 0.0120 0.0167 0.0023 0.3267 0.0270 0.0656 
Std.  Dev.  0.0127 0.0039 0.0061 0.0021 0.0221 0.0039 0.0074 
Post crisis vs pre crisis 
Avg  (2007Q3-2008Q2)  0.0871 0.0043 0.0066  -0.0079 0.2758 0.0149 0.0451 
Avg  (2006Q3-2007Q2)  0.0922 0.0030 0.0042  -0.0081 0.2639 0.0148 0.0461 
Difference  -0.0051 0.0013 0.0024 0.0002 0.0119 0.0000  -0.0009 
Ttest    0.3281 0.4040 0.2781 0.7786 0.4076 0.9834 0.7703 
Post vs pre Lehman 
2009Q1  0.0980 0.0083  -0.0001  -0.0014 0.3075 0.0105 0.0267 
2008Q3  0.0856 0.0041 0.0021  -0.0058 0.2848 0.0152 0.0466 
2007Q2  0.0897 0.0070 0.0072  -0.0095 0.2650 0.0151 0.0486 
Diff.  (2009Q1-2008Q3)  0.0123  0.0041 -0.0022  0.0044  0.0227 -0.0047 -0.0199 
Paired  Diff.    0.0118  0.0023 -0.0035  0.0051  0.0267 -0.0046 -0.0203 
Ttest  2008Q3=2009Q1*  0.0001 0.4534 0.3620 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Diff.  (2009Q1-2007Q2)  0.0082  0.0012 -0.0073  0.0080  0.0425 -0.0046 -0.0219 
Paired  Diff.    0.0109  0.0002 -0.0120  0.0085  0.0428 -0.0050 -0.0230 





Panel B:  Debt Rating 











Leverage Capex Operating 
cash flow 
Avg 1983-2004  0.0603 0.0051 0.0073  -0.0019 0.2762 0.0188 0.0468 
Avg 1990-2004  0.0577 0.0049 0.0068  -0.0022 0.2789 0.0180 0.0476 
Min  0.0450 -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0090  0.2330  0.0105  0.0267 
Max  0.0980 0.0155 0.0204 0.0042 0.3075 0.0276 0.0611 
Std.  Dev.  0.0123 0.0034 0.0056 0.0023 0.0163 0.0039 0.0072 
Post crisis vs pre crisis 
Avg  (2007Q3-2008Q2)  0.0810 0.0080 0.0109  -0.0106 0.2469 0.0138 0.0505 
Avg  (2006Q3-2007Q2)  0.0821 0.0044 0.0060  -0.0097 0.2282 0.0139 0.0500 
Difference  -0.0011 0.0036 0.0049  -0.0009 0.0187  -0.0001 0.0005 
Ttest    0.7722 0.0248 0.0180 0.2234 0.0938 0.8942 0.8773 
Post vs pre Lehman 
2009Q1  0.0947 0.0053 0.0001  -0.0014 0.2687 0.0100 0.0334 
2008Q3  0.0828 0.0051 0.0065  -0.0084 0.2579 0.0134 0.0505 
2007Q2  0.0804 0.0056 0.0069  -0.0106 0.2314 0.0137 0.0522 
Diff.  (2009Q1-2008Q3)  0.0119 0.0002  -0.0064 0.0069 0.0108  -0.0034  -0.0170 
Paired  Diff.    0.0105 0.0000  -0.0067 0.0072 0.0178  -0.0036  -0.0168 
Ttest  2008Q3=2009Q1*  0.0001 0.9913 0.0545 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Diff.  (2009Q1-2007Q2)  0.0143 -0.0003 -0.0068  0.0092  0.0374 -0.0037 -0.0187 
Paired  Diff.    0.0128 -0.0005 -0.0068  0.0093  0.0405 -0.0042 -0.0197 
Ttest  2007Q2=2009Q1  0.0021 0.8179 0.0079 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 











Leverage Capex Operating 
cash flow 
Avg 1983-2004  0.0942 0.0096 0.0125 0.0048 0.4471 0.0184 0.0316 
Avg 1990-2004  0.0905 0.0087 0.0119 0.0065 0.4649 0.0186 0.0314 
Min  0.0729 -0.0056 -0.0091 -0.0144  0.2398  0.0100  0.0118 
Max  0.1332 0.0337 0.0446 0.0168 0.5266 0.0278 0.0602 
Std.  Dev.  0.0135 0.0087 0.0108 0.0055 0.0632 0.0041 0.0090 
Post crisis vs pre crisis 
Avg  (2007Q3-2008Q2)  0.0809 0.0057 0.0089 0.0010 0.4122 0.0189 0.0372 
Avg  (2006Q3-2007Q2)  0.0886 0.0134 0.0163 0.0022 0.4044 0.0184 0.0368 
Difference  -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0073 -0.0012  0.0078  0.0005  0.0004 
Ttest    0.1047 0.0001 0.0031 0.3379 0.5918 0.5985 0.8755 
Post vs pre Lehman 
2009Q1  0.0886 -0.0035 -0.0120  0.0007  0.4499  0.0122  0.0185 
2008Q3  0.0803 0.0048 0.0068 0.0000 0.4204 0.0185 0.0397 
2007Q2  0.0859 0.0168 0.0205 0.0018 0.4109 0.0197 0.0410 42 
 











Leverage Capex Operating 
cash flow  
Diff.  (2009Q1-2008Q3)  0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0188  0.0006  0.0295 -0.0063 -0.0212 
Paired  Diff.    0.0090 -0.0086 -0.0195  0.0006  0.0316 -0.0064 -0.0249 
Ttest  2008Q3=2009Q1*  0.0001 0.0025 0.0001 0.5091 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Diff.  (2009Q  -2007Q2)  0.0027 -0.0203 -0.0325 -0.0011  0.0390 -0.0075 -0.0225 
Paired Diff.   -0.0004  -0.0214  -0.0360 -0.0022  0.0395 -0.0083 -0.0249 
Ttest  2007Q2=2009Q1  0.5070 0.0001 0.0001 0.1746 0.0001  0.00017 0.0001 











Leverage Capex Operating 
cash flow 
Avg 1983-2004  0.1801 0.0044 0.0082 0.0148 0.2148 0.0180 0.0249 
Avg 1990-2004  0.1962 0.0038 0.0069 0.0166 0.1990 0.0169 0.0264 
Min  0.1215 -0.0013 -0.0015  0.0041  0.1428  0.0104  0.0120 
Max  0.2755 0.0120 0.0171 0.0429 0.2676 0.0275 0.0416 
Std.  Dev.  0.0441 0.0032 0.0049 0.0067 0.0356 0.0035 0.0073 
Post crisis vs pre crisis 
Avg  (2007Q3-2008Q2)  0.2562 0.0067 0.0083 0.0080 0.1625 0.0141 0.0279 
Avg  (2006Q3-2007Q2)  0.2671 0.0054 0.0069 0.0152 0.1504 0.0141 0.0279 
Difference  -0.0109 0.0013 0.0014  -0.0071 0.0121 0.0000 0.0000 
Ttest    0.0147 0.0830 0.1540 0.0001 0.0018 0.9289 0.9646 
Post vs pre Lehman 
2009Q1  0.2414 -0.0020 -0.0035  0.0042  0.1808  0.0091  0.0088 
2008Q3  0.2370 0.0044 0.0087 0.0040 0.1751 0.0136 0.0274 
2007Q2  0.2677 0.0063 0.0089 0.0204 0.1541 0.0142 0.0244 
Diff.  (2009Q1-2008Q3)  0.0044 -0.0064 -0.0122  0.0002  0.0057 -0.0045 -0.0186 
Paired  Diff.    0.0060 -0.0059 -0.0117  0.0006  0.0124 -0.0048 -0.0204 
Ttest  2008Q3=2009Q1*  0.0006 0.0001 0.0001 0.6170 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Diff. (2009Q1-2007Q2)  -0.0263  -0.0083  -0.0124 -0.0162  0.0267 -0.0051 -0.0156 
Paired Diff.   -0.0292  -0.0085  -0.0134 -0.0162  0.0328 -0.0059 -0.0192 
Ttest  2007Q2=2009Q1  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Panel C:  Unconstrained vs Constrained 











Leverage Capex Operating 
cash flow 
Post crisis vs pre crisis 
Avg  (2007Q3-2008Q2)  0.1607 0.0060 0.0082 0.0008 0.2342 0.0145 0.0355 
Avg  (2006Q3-2007Q2)  0.1741 0.0055 0.0078 0.0058 0.2227 0.0149 0.0309 
Difference  -0.0134 0.0005 0.0004  -0.0050 0.0115  -0.0004  -0.0004 
Ttest    0.0001 0.4625 0.6731 0.0001 0.0084 0.3448 0.7817 
Post vs pre Lehman 
2009Q1  0.1572 -0.0020 -0.0059  0.0009  0.2586  0.0097  0.0205 
2008Q3  0.1499 0.0043 0.0072  -0.0001 0.2451 0.0138 0.0362 
2007Q2  0.1741 0.0037 0.0071 0.0088 0.2260 0.0149 0.0355 
Diff. (2009Q1 - 2008Q3)  0.0074  -0.0062  -0.0131  0.0011  0.0135  -0.0040  -0.0156 
Paired  Diff.    0.0093 -0.0064 -0.0133  0.0017  0.0160 -0.0042 -0.0166 
Ttest  2008Q3=2009Q1*  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0487 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Diff. (2009Q1 - 2007Q2)  -0.0168  -0.0057  -0.0130 -0.0078  0.0326 -0.0052 -0.0150 
Paired  Diff.    -0.0117 -0.0066 -0.0142 -0.0059  0.0350 -0.0059 -0.0195 
Ttest  2007Q2=2009Q1  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 











Leverage Capex Operating 
cash flow  
Post crisis vs pre crisis 
Avg  (2007Q3-2008Q2)  0.3370 0.0073 0.0082 0.0118 0.1417 0.0147 0.0241 
Avg  (2006Q3-2007Q2)  0.3551 0.0099 0.0101 0.0245 0.1234 0.0147 0.0220 
Difference  -0.0181 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0127  0.0183 -0.0001  0.0021 
Ttest    0.0669 0.0194 0.2176 0.0001 0.0039 0.9201 0.4239 
Post vs pre Lehman 
2009Q1  0.3109 0.0002  -0.0030 0.0076 0.1565 0.0095  -0.0033 
2008Q3  0.3073 0.0045 0.0088 0.0042 0.1567 0.0144 0.0241 
2007Q2  0.3577 0.0207 0.0210 0.0309 0.1321 0.0154 0.0123 
Diff. (2009Q1 - 2008Q3)  0.0037  -0.0043  -0.0118  0.0033  -0.0002  -0.0049  -0.0274 
Paired  Diff.    0.0060 -0.0032 -0.0102  0.0030  0.0115 -0.0052 -0.0292 
Ttest  2008Q3=2009Q1*  0.1116 0.1497 0.0013 0.2541 0.0057 0.0001 0.0001 
Diff. (2009Q1 - 2007Q2)  -0.0468  -0.0205  -0.0240 -0.0234  0.0244 -0.0059 -0.0156 
Paired  Diff.    -0.0457 -0.0195 -0.0232 -0.0275  0.0342 -0.0068 -0.0227 
Ttest  2007Q2=2009Q1  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 4: Expected and unexpected cash holdings, net debt issuance and net equity issuance 
Panel A examines the determinants of cash holdings.  Panel B examines the determinants of debt 
issuance, whether debt issuance is defined as the change in long-term and short-term debt. Panel C 
examines the determinants of equity issuance.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Quarterly Cash/assets 













Sigma12  1.4888*** 1.7493*** 0.3179*** 0.2746*** 0.5106*** 1.6722*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-book  0.0203*** 0.0204*** 0.0166*** 0.0164*** 0.0360*** 0.0199*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.0046***  0.0106***  -0.0021**  -0.0027***  -0.0059***  0.0008** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
Operating cash flow  0.0415***  0.0091  0.1123***  0.1232***  -0.0123  0.0205*** 
(0.000) (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.386) (0.000) 
NWC  -0.2643*** -0.2869*** -0.1722*** -0.0854*** -0.1771*** -0.2852*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capex  -1.0653*** -1.1622*** -0.5009*** -0.7476*** -0.3640*** -1.1952*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.3538*** -0.4339*** -0.1449*** -0.1687*** -0.1150*** -0.4264*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D  0.3889*** 0.3329*** 0.6829*** 0.6665*** 1.1383*** 0.3485*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rdmiss -0.0132***  -0.0236***  0.0049***  0.0153***  0.0053***  -0.0208*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Divdum  -0.0439*** -0.0282*** -0.0574*** -0.0255*** -0.0255*** -0.0336*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquisitions  -0.5514*** -0.6394*** -0.3616*** -0.3146*** -0.5487*** -0.5948*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  equity  Issuance  0.2489*** 0.2310*** 0.2577*** 0.1118*** 0.2674*** 0.2428*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net  LT  debt  Issuance  0.3171*** 0.3266*** 0.1944*** 0.2184*** 0.2910*** 0.3336*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dqtr2  0.0008 0.0001 0.0006 0.0012 0.0019 0.0004 
(0.479) (0.945) (0.811) (0.478) (0.424) (0.781) 
dqtr3  0.0021*  0.0014 0.0019 0.0027 0.0023 0.0017 
(0.067) (0.347) (0.462) (0.100) (0.325) (0.218) 
dqtr4 0.0055***  0.0050***  0.0039  0.0067***  0.0040*  0.0050*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.144) (0.000) (0.081) (0.000) 
dum051  0.0259*** 0.0248*** 0.0252*** 0.0244***  -0.0040  0.0287*** 45 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.390) (0.000) 
dum052  0.0248*** 0.0242*** 0.0258*** 0.0239***  -0.0061  0.0278*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.170) (0.000) 
dum053  0.0205*** 0.0200*** 0.0277*** 0.0205***  -0.0069  0.0227*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.145) (0.000) 
dum054  0.0246*** 0.0237*** 0.0262*** 0.0209***  0.0024  0.0265*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.627) (0.000) 
dum061  0.0213*** 0.0188*** 0.0198*** 0.0212***  -0.0021  0.0229*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.677) (0.000) 
dum062  0.0233*** 0.0227*** 0.0181*** 0.0151***  -0.0036  0.0263*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.457) (0.000) 
dum063  0.0214*** 0.0194*** 0.0162*** 0.0115***  -0.0023  0.0241*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.627) (0.000) 
dum064  0.0210*** 0.0177*** 0.0187*** 0.0124***  -0.0041  0.0226*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.375) (0.000) 
dum071  0.0266*** 0.0234*** 0.0171*** 0.0137***  -0.0047  0.0301*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.345) (0.000) 
dum072  0.0258*** 0.0223*** 0.0156*** 0.0122***  -0.0064  0.0286*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.003) (0.182) (0.000) 
dum073  0.0268*** 0.0250*** 0.0150***  0.0106**  -0.0058  0.0307*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.012) (0.209) (0.000) 
dum074 0.0259***  0.0250***  0.0102*  0.0094**  -0.0070  0.0299*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.022) (0.106) (0.000) 
dum081  0.0200***  0.0189*** 0.0110** 0.0154***  -0.0110***  0.0221*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
dum082 0.0140***  0.0130***  0.0096*  0.0151***  -0.0138***  0.0152*** 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.069) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
dum083 0.0154***  0.0131***  0.0094*  0.0168***  -0.0054  0.0157*** 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.058) (0.000) (0.170) (0.000) 
dum084  0.0256***  0.0244*** 0.0117** 0.0204***  0.0017  0.0279*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.710) (0.000) 
dum091 0.0460***  0.0327**  0.0439***  0.0778***  0.0173  0.0387*** 
(0.000) (0.023) (0.005) (0.000) (0.210) (0.002) 
Constant  0.2913*** 0.0373*** 0.1549*** 0.1415*** 0.2046*** 0.2083*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 182,301  120,764  10,135  16,828  21,581  143,892 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.454 0.446 0.431 0.382 0.395 0.450 
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Panel B: Net Total Debt Issuance 













                    
lag_dqsize -0.0087***  -0.0085***  -0.0113*** -0.0198***  -0.0021  -0.0094*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000) (0.584) (0.000) 
lag_ocf -0.0094***  -0.0139***  0.0057  0.0242**  0.0166  -0.0113*** 
(0.001) (0.000)  (0.770)  (0.031) (0.118) (0.000) 
lag_dividends 0.0820*  -0.0752  0.2592**  0.5385***  0.1661  0.0043 
(0.057) (0.201)  (0.030)  (0.000) (0.371) (0.932) 
divdum -0.0029***  0.0004  -0.0069***  -0.0074***  -0.0037***  -0.0013** 
(0.000) (0.529)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.015) 
lag2_leverage -0.0098***  -0.0128***  -0.0118*** -0.0278*** -0.0365*** -0.0120*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lag_ngbe 0.0035***  0.0050***  0.0027  0.0066  -0.0012  0.0063*** 
(0.006) (0.003)  (0.464)  (0.216) (0.563) (0.000) 
lag2_logmc -0.0002**  -0.0003  0.0001 -0.0014***  -0.0026***  -0.0006*** 
(0.049) (0.102)  (0.758)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lag_MB 0.0019***  0.0019***  0.0007  0.0013**  0.0088***  0.0019*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.108)  (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
lag2_cash -0.0158***  -0.0168***  -0.0166*** -0.0224*** -0.0161*** -0.0151*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
lag2_stdebt -0.0295***  -0.0278***  -0.0147 -0.0224*** -0.0123 -0.0290*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.221)  (0.009) (0.174) (0.000) 
lag_R&D -0.0188*  -0.0085  -0.0472 -0.0408  -0.2986***  -0.0124 
(0.062) (0.436)  (0.366)  (0.430) (0.000) (0.231) 
lag_capex 0.3138***  0.2997***  0.3204***  0.2746***  0.4637***  0.2853*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dqtr2 -0.0013**  0.0000  -0.0003  -0.0013  -0.0016  -0.0009 
(0.018) (0.950)  (0.862)  (0.392) (0.393) (0.121) 
dqtr3 0.0000  0.0013**  0.0004  0.0004  -0.0025  0.0006 
(0.970) (0.040)  (0.811)  (0.792) (0.172) (0.300) 
dqtr4 -0.0037***  -0.0026***  -0.0037** -0.0035**  -0.0029  -0.0035*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.028)  (0.017) (0.124) (0.000) 
dum051 -0.0039***  -0.0023  -0.0094*** -0.0064** -0.0095*** -0.0027** 
(0.001) (0.118)  (0.008)  (0.041) (0.005) (0.034) 
dum052 -0.0031***  -0.0029**  -0.0029 -0.0056** -0.0026 -0.0030** 
(0.005) (0.040)  (0.466)  (0.028) (0.492) (0.015) 
dum053 -0.0018  -0.0025*  0.0016  0.0033  -0.0021  -0.0027** 
(0.110) (0.083)  (0.696)  (0.357) (0.515) (0.033) 
dum054 -0.0004  -0.0022  0.0011  0.0021  -0.0059*  -0.0003 
(0.722) (0.155)  (0.691)  (0.472) (0.087) (0.831) 47 
 
dum061 -0.0030***  -0.0014  -0.0021 -0.0068*** -0.0028  -0.0029** 
(0.006) (0.333)  (0.606)  (0.007) (0.466) (0.019) 
dum062 -0.0003  -0.0025*  0.0055  0.0035  -0.0024  -0.0009 
(0.797) (0.089)  (0.170)  (0.213) (0.481) (0.507) 
dum063 -0.0006  -0.0007  -0.0035  -0.0026  0.0031  -0.0013 
(0.568) (0.613)  (0.265)  (0.334) (0.418) (0.284) 
dum064 0.0015  0.0020  0.0015  0.0005  0.0029  0.0008 
(0.240) (0.246)  (0.624)  (0.868) (0.441) (0.601) 
dum071 -0.0008  0.0005  -0.0058**  -0.0037  -0.0001  -0.0009 
(0.529) (0.758)  (0.015)  (0.171) (0.982) (0.508) 
dum072 0.0029**  0.0022  0.0048  0.0023  0.0084*  0.0015 
(0.024) (0.187)  (0.173)  (0.436) (0.052) (0.286) 
dum073 0.0004  -0.0010  0.0009  0.0047*  -0.0032  0.0004 
(0.755) (0.539)  (0.778)  (0.069) (0.392) (0.804) 
dum074 0.0037***  0.0020  0.0048*  0.0086**  -0.0016  0.0038** 
(0.006) (0.252)  (0.077)  (0.010) (0.670) (0.015) 
dum081 0.0008  0.0027*  -0.0046*  -0.0012  -0.0046  0.0023* 
(0.479) (0.079)  (0.058)  (0.632) (0.105) (0.089) 
dum082 -0.0009  -0.0003  0.0018  0.0033  -0.0068***  -0.0001 
(0.381) (0.848)  (0.491)  (0.174) (0.005) (0.961) 
dum083 -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0031  -0.0000  -0.0030  0.0005 
(0.822) (0.805)  (0.174)  (0.995) (0.298) (0.710) 
dum084 -0.0052***  -0.0059***  0.0014  -0.0001  -0.0117***  -0.0045*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.650)  (0.969) (0.000) (0.000) 
dum091 -0.0129***  -0.0092***  -0.0099*** -0.0107*** -0.0238*** -0.0103*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0082***  0.0079***  0.0064  0.0248***  0.0282***  0.0095*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.122)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 182,604  118,572  11,470  18,673  22,741  141,190 
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Panel C: Net Equity Issuance 
 













                    
lag_dqsize -0.0002  -0.0041**  0.0091***  0.0097***  0.0092***  -0.0021 
(0.890) (0.018)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.167) 
lag_ocf -0.0737***  -0.0726***  -0.0333*** -0.0307*** -0.0235*** -0.0726*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lag_dividends -0.5862***  -0.6322***  -0.2162***  0.0214  0.0386  -0.6028*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.620) (0.779) (0.000) 
divdum  0.0014*** 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0008  0.0011** 
(0.000) (0.272)  (0.892)  (0.409) (0.279) (0.011) 
lag2_leverage 0.0118***  0.0040***  0.0142***  0.0158***  0.0048***  0.0085*** 
(0.000) (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
lag_ngbe -0.0016  -0.0002  -0.0018 -0.0092***  -0.0024**  0.0008 
(0.159) (0.913)  (0.182)  (0.000) (0.043) (0.641) 
lag2_logmc -0.0036***  -0.0042***  -0.0008*** -0.0004*** -0.0012*** -0.0043*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
lag_MB  0.0099***  0.0117*** -0.0006** -0.0017*** 0.0054*** 0.0108*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.035)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lag2_cash -0.0199***  -0.0224***  -0.0025 -0.0129*** -0.0023 -0.0201*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.556)  (0.000) (0.520) (0.000) 
lag2_stdebt 0.0015  0.0077***  -0.0157***  -0.0156***  0.0023  0.0027 
(0.476) (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.599) (0.266) 
lag_R&D 0.3464***  0.3464***  0.1109***  0.1260***  0.0105  0.3434*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.781) (0.000) 
lag_capex 0.1432***  0.1617***  0.1025***  0.0411***  0.0969***  0.1523*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dqtr2 -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0007 
(0.107) (0.237)  (0.741)  (0.949) (0.717) (0.252) 
dqtr3 -0.0029***  -0.0030***  -0.0019*** -0.0016***  -0.0018*  -0.0030*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.001) (0.083) (0.000) 
dqtr4 -0.0005  -0.0001  -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0002 
(0.323) (0.899)  (0.147)  (0.447) (0.177) (0.683) 
dum051 0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0021**  -0.0004  -0.0029*  -0.0002 
(0.922) (0.805)  (0.035)  (0.642) (0.056) (0.870) 
dum052 -0.0016*  -0.0015  -0.0033*** -0.0029***  -0.0022  -0.0020* 
(0.085) (0.281)  (0.006)  (0.004) (0.127) (0.093) 
dum053 0.0028***  0.0037**  -0.0016  -0.0017*  -0.0004  0.0033** 
(0.006) (0.014)  (0.143)  (0.081) (0.782) (0.012) 
dum054 0.0005  0.0014  -0.0025**  -0.0022**  -0.0000  0.0003 49 
 
(0.636) (0.390)  (0.044)  (0.028) (0.990) (0.843) 
dum061 0.0028**  0.0041**  -0.0030**  -0.0017  -0.0043***  0.0039*** 
(0.013) (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.113) (0.000) (0.008) 
dum062 -0.0025**  -0.0013  -0.0044*** -0.0083*** -0.0045***  -0.0023 
(0.019) (0.442)  (0.010)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.104) 
dum063 -0.0022***  -0.0028**  -0.0054*** -0.0058*** -0.0037***  -0.0025** 
(0.009) (0.026)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.009) (0.022) 
dum064  0.0021*  0.0030* -0.0026***  -0.0023** -0.0034** 0.0030** 
(0.069) (0.093)  (0.005)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.045) 
dum071 -0.0018*  -0.0025*  -0.0049*** -0.0056***  -0.0013  -0.0024** 
(0.066) (0.084)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.584) (0.042) 
dum072 0.0018  0.0053***  -0.0070***  -0.0064***  -0.0041**  0.0035** 
(0.129) (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.023) (0.026) 
dum073 -0.0009  0.0003  -0.0069***  -0.0087***  -0.0046**  0.0000 
(0.424) (0.850)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.013) (0.984) 
dum074 -0.0023**  -0.0016  -0.0051*** -0.0055***  -0.0026  -0.0025* 
(0.040) (0.344)  (0.000)  (0.006) (0.129) (0.084) 
dum081 -0.0069***  -0.0082***  -0.0059*** -0.0074*** -0.0067*** -0.0080*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dum082 -0.0026***  -0.0043***  -0.0012 -0.0025**  -0.0032***  -0.0036*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.352)  (0.024) (0.006) (0.000) 
dum083 -0.0014*  -0.0029**  -0.0015  -0.0030*** -0.0039***  -0.0018* 
(0.061) (0.011)  (0.114)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.066) 
dum084  -0.0043*** -0.0083*** 0.0001  -0.0007  -0.0013 -0.0066*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.913)  (0.300) (0.360) (0.000) 
dum091 0.0007  -0.0018*  0.0008  0.0021***  -0.0021**  -0.0002 
(0.251) (0.065)  (0.363)  (0.006) (0.020) (0.787) 
Constant 0.0061***  0.0061***  0.0036**  0.0009  0.0028  0.0075*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.316) (0.127) (0.000) 
Observations 184,186  119,498  11,589  18,786  22,986  142,414 
Adjusted  R-squared 0.117  0.123 0.085 0.076 0.024 0.123 
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Figure 1: Cash/Assets by Size Groupings 
We use NYSE cutoffs for firm size quintiles and normalize the average cash/assets ratio to 1 at the start of the credit 
boom. Sizerank = 0 (4) are the smallest (largest) firms. 
 
 
Figure 2: Net Debt Issuance by Size Groupings 
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Figure  3: Net Equity Issuance by Size Groupings 
We use NYSE cutoffs for firm size quintiles. Sizerank = 0 (4) are the smallest (largest) firms. 
 
 
Figure  4: Cash/Assets by Rating Groupings 
We divide firms quarterly into firms with an investment grade rating, a speculative rating, and no rating using the 
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Appendix 
All variables are quarterly, unless otherwise noted.  For variables reported on a year-to-date basis, the 
quarterly value is calculated by subtracting the lagged value from the current value; in the first quarter of 
a fiscal year, the lagged value is set equal to zero.  Variables names preceded by “lag” are the value of 
that variable in the previous quarter; variable names preceded by lag2 are the value of that variable two 
quarters prior. 
Variable name  Description 
  
Avgtint  Average of monthly intermediate term treasuries during the quarter 
Capex capital  expenditures  (capxy) / lagged assets 
Cash   cash and marketable securities (cheq) divided by assets 
Divdum    dummy variable equal to one if firm paid dividends 
Dividends  total cash dividends (dvy) minus preferred dividends (dvpq) paid during the 
quarter, divided by lagged assets 
Dqsize  assets minus lagged assets, divided by lagged assets 
Indmlev  median industry market leverage ratio in the previous quarter, based on the 
industry groupings in Fama and French (2002). 
Leverage  long-term debt (dlttq) plus debt in current liabilities (dlcq), divided by assets 
(atq) 
logMC  log (market value of equity) 
Size  log (book value of assets in 2009 dollars) 
Mkt lev  long-term debt (dlttq) plus debt in current liabilities (dlcq), divided by long-term 
debt (dlttq) plus debt in current liabilities (dlcq) plus the market value of 
common equity 
Sigma12  the median of the standard deviations of cash flow/assets over past 12 quarters 
for firms in the same industry, as defined by two-digit SIC code.  
Net equity 
Issuance 
equity issuance (sstky) minus aggregate equity repurchase (prstkcy), divided by 
lagged assets 
Net LT debt 
Issuance 
long-term debt issuance (dltisy) minus long-term debt retirement (dltry) divided 
by lagged assets 
Net total debt 
issuance 
change in long-term debt (dlttq) and debt in current liabilities (dlcq) during the 
quarter, divided by lagged assets 
NgBE  dummy variable equal to one if book equity (ceqq) is less than 0 




Operating cash flow calculated following Minton and Schrand (1999) as sales 
(saleq) less cost of goods sold (cogsq) less selling, general and administrative 
expenses (xsgaq) less the change in working capital for the period, divided by 
total assets (atq). Working capital is current assets other than cash and short-term 
investments less current liabilities and is calculated as the sum of the non-
missing amounts for accounts receivable (rectq), inventory (invtq), and other 
current assets (acoq) less the sum of the non-missing amounts for accounts 
payable (apq), income taxes payable (txpq), and other current liabilities (lcoq). If 
all components of working capital are missing in either the current quarter or the 
previous quarter, working capital and operating cash flow are both set equal to 
missing. Quarterly selling, general and administrative expenses exclude one-
quarter of annual research and development costs (xrd) and advertising expenses 
(xad) when those data items are available.  
Acquisitions acquisitions  (acqy) divided by assets 
PPE   PPE (ppentq) divided by assets 
MB  market-to-book calculated as book value of assets (atq) minus book value of 
common equity (ceqq) plus the  market value of common equity (cshoq*prccq) 
Qspr_hy2  spread of Merrill Lynch US High Yield 100 Index over intermediate term 
treasuries, averaged over each month of the quarter 
R&D   R&D (xrdq) / assets.  If R&D is reported annually, then quarterly R&D is set 
equal to one-fourth of annual R&D.  If R&D is missing, it is set equal to 0. 
Rated  dummy variable equal to one if the S&P long-term rating (splticrm) available on 
Compustat is investment grade or speculative 
Rdmiss  dummy variable equal to one if R&D is missing in Compustat 
STDebt  change in debt in current liabilities (dlcq), divided by lagged assets 
  
 